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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Unions under Authoritarian Regimes 
both the literature and political experience suggest that under 
authoritarian regimes (fascist, military, populist), labour unions are 
generally deeply and negatively affected in their political development. 
In the case of fascist and military regimes, it is because of the 
strong repression and control being exercised by the fascist party 
and/or the State. Typical examples are Germany and Italy between the 
1920s and mid-1940s; Spain and Portugal until recently; and Argentina 
and Brazil during the 1960s in contemporary Latin American history. 
In the case of populist regimes, control rather than repression is 
the word which would best describe the State and its Party/Union 
relationship, with the State actually giving birth to the working 
class, the unions and the Populist Party - which in turn is supported 
by the unions, the workers and the middle classes - through forced 
state industrialisation policies (e.g. Mexico, Brazil - and to 
some extent Argentina - between the 1930s and 1950s). 
The conditions and characteristics of such regimes tend to differ 
from one to another. 1) Fascist regimes are born in the 'weakest link' 
of the imperialist chain and developed under the hegemony of a fascist 
party with huge mass followings in the petty bourgeoisie although con-
trolled from the beginning by financial capital. 2)Military dictator-
ships develop in countries with a minimum level of industrialised but 
dependent economies, under the political hegemony of the military -
its Righ Command - and controlled by financial (although dependent) 
capital. 3) Populist regimes grow under the hegemony of rising (native) 
capitalist interests. All such regimes rise and fall during periods 
of deep strains within the imperialist countries, including contra-
dictions between them in the first two cases (the 1920s and 1930s in 
the European case and the 1960s and 1970s under US-EEC capital-growing 
competitions in Spain, Portugal and Latin America, leading to a 
democratisation process; or military coups). 
The case of populist regimes, on the other hand, is characterised 
by a period of lessening of the countries' imperialist links, under a 
weak or relatively weak development of the working class, with indepen-
dent native capitalist development processes which actually create or 
further develop and are supported by the working class. The least 
typical case is Argentina, where there was already a certain working 
class base when Peron took over the Labour Ministry and which was a 
much richer country compared with Cardenas' Mexico and Vargas' Brazil 
and could therefore confront to a greater extent the new US world 
hegemony after the war. This made the Argentine case a strong working 
Research for this paper was carried out with the support of the 
U.S. S.S.R.C., while the author was Departmental Visitor (Sociology) 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science. 
class based populism, enjoying a relatively independent position 
vis-a-vis the State. 
Three political characteristics of these regimes are of 
crucial importance to our analysis. First, the different 
instrument of control being exercised in each of the three types 
of authoritarianism. While in the fascist and populist situations 
the party plays a crucial role and therefore the ideological means 
are the predominant factor, in the case of the military dictator- . 
ships, repression is the prevailing form of control. This makes 
the military dictatorships apparently stronger because of their 
ability to destroy the old and construct a new social order, but 
in the long run, much weaker, because of its lack of a soul, 
consensus and mass following. This aspect is also important when 
considering the ability of the regimes to corporatise intermediate 
social forces (private ideological apparatus - i.e. the Church-
middle strata and even sectors of the State apparatus, i.e. the 
Military as an institution). Secondly, the achievements of the 
radical transformation and reorganisation of the capital accumula-
tion process that each of the regimes managed, as well as the 
strength of the unions before such regimes controlled State power, 
is also important. In fact, the capitalist economic develop-
ment with increased employment rates which took place in some of 
these regimes, together with the myth of an 'economic miracle1 was 
important in legitimising State rule. Where this was not the case, 
e.g., Portugal and Argentina in the 1960s, the consequence was a 
deep radicalisation of the military and the complete hegemony of 
the communists in the unions or a strong union resistance and the 
rise of a 'democratic1 military leadership (Lanusse). Lastly, 
the international correlation of forces and the strength of the 
international union organisations are important in setting the 
general economic and political conditions for whether or not 
the regimes arrive at a stabilisation or come to an end. Today 
there is little world consensus for authoritarian regimes, and 
many such regimes have come to an end with hardly anybody opposing 
their downfall. Moreover, international unions have actively 
criticised such regimes. This was not the case during the inter-
war years, during the war and in the cold war period that followed. 
I have tried to exemplify the economic and political characteris-
tics of these regimes in Table 1. 
In the case of Chile, we have a favourable world consensus 
for democracy at the time of the coup (in particular every sector 
of the international union movement) supporting widespread demo-
cratic and union struggles. Moreover, by 1973 there was in Chile 
a strong working class with long-established traditions going back 
to the previous century and a modernising of the economy, but with 
a low growth rate. Massive unemployment, negative or low invest-
ment and growth rates followed after the 1973 coup with a renewed 
control of the economy by US financial capital and hardly any 
'negotiation' of dependent relations (contrary to what Franco, for 
instance, had done to some extent throughout his rule). These 
conditions, associated with the inability of the fascists and 
military who organised the coup to maintain, organise and develop 
a mass following among the middle sectors (which they did enjoy to 
some extent before the coup) and the hegemony of the military 
Table 1 
Characteristics and Party Union State Relationships 
in Authoritarian Regimes 
Fascism Military Populism 
Dictatorships 
Old New (LA) 
(Europe) (LA) 
******* 
Economic and working ++ + + or - ++ 
class expansion 
Previous working class + + Spain + Arg. 
autonomy and development - Port. - Braz. 
Hegemony of financial + + + 
capital 
Means of control: 
- Repression vs. - + + 
- Ideology + ++ 
Instrument of control: 
- Party vs. ++ — ++ 
- The Military — + ++ 
Role of country within 'Weak link1 within Minimum indus- Low development 
imperialist system imperialist chain trialisation and dependent 
level in a level, 
dependent 
economy World democratic consensus and 
strength of international unions 
when regimes were: 
- Rising - - + -
- Falling + + + + 
Corporativisation of + + 
intermediate social forces 
Political development of + Arg. 
the working cliss at the - + + Brazil & 
fall of regime Mexico 
high command and their style of 'politics' (closely associated with 
the most imperialised sector of native monopoly capital), make 
the Chilean regime, when analysed beyond its appearance, basically 
weak in the middle range and particularly so in the long run. The 
problem is to what extent have the military in power been able to 
weaken the union movement structurally and politically, and to what 
extent they have used the basic weakness of the military regime to 
maintain a basic structural presence in the country, reorganise, 
unite and develop alternative propositions which gain mass support 
within the unions and broader sectors and struggle to achieve 
such objectives. This question will be answered by analysing the 
concrete present conditions and struggles of the unions. First we 
will look at the main features of the unions' pre-coup development 
and their structural strengths. 
B. The Development of the Unions up to 1973 
By September 1973, workers represented almost 80% of the 
employed population and more than half of all Chileans who were 
employed were proletarians or productive wage workers of the 
agriculture, mining, industrial, construction, energy,and water and 
transport sectors. Out of the total wage and salaried population, 
as many as 44% were organised'into 10,000 unions representing 
1,100,000 members. There were three types of union organisations with 
300,000 members each: the State employees* 'associations' (Which 
finally achieved legal recognition during the Popular Government); 
the plant, interplant and national 'professional unions' , 
organising those who fell within the legal category of 'empleados' 
a privileged stratum;and the 'agricultural unions' which were county-
based. Blue collar 'industrial unions' were set up by plants and had 
200,000 members. The professional unions were made up of white, 
collar but also some (basically 'skilled') blue collar workers from 
large and new industrial sectors (power and electricity, petroleum, 
steel, etc.) and,as the associations and agricultural unions, were 
allowed to bargain locally or at the national level, a right which 
plant-based industrial unions did not have formally but developed 
on a de facto basis since the late 1960s (without leaving aside their 
more concrete negotiating at the plant level). 
By 1971 there were 87 national unions, associations and 
federations all affiliated to the one single National Union/Council 
CUT. 
Chile's first national strike took place as early as 1890. 
By 1925 there were already 204,000 manual workers organised into 214 
free union councils(as much as 46% of the wage and salaried popula-
tion)organised into one main national council FOCH, which was 
affiliated to the Red International. Another 90,000 workers 
were organised into legally recognised mutual aid societies. But 
such unions were almost completely wiped out by the Government 
repression that followed the enactment of the new labour laws in 
1924. These were being prepared since 1919 by both the Liberal 
and Conservative coalitions, but were never enacted until the mili-
taryforced parliament to do so. However, it was not until the 
Popular Front Government (an alliance of radicals, socialists 
and communists under the hegemony of the Social Democratic 
Radicals) that the massive setting up of legal unions did take 
place and the State- and employer-controlled unions and the collective 
bargaining system arrived at an institutionalisation and were 
finally supported by the Government, the Employers and the Unions 
themselves. A new union council, CTCH, was set up in 1936 after 
the creation of the Front and soon became formally part of the 
alliance. CTCH was finally divided and destroyed in 1946-47 
because of the following conditions which arose from the Popular 
Front experiment: a) The contradictory experience of a radical 
union movement forced suddenly to become controlled by and adapt 
to a capitalist State and industrialisation process, where the 
employers got most of the economic benefits (160 in 1945, from a 
basis of 100 in 1940), while unions had to refrain from their 
traditional militant striking activities; b) the political 
infights between communists and socialists on political and 
clientelistic grounds; and c) the post war repressive pro-US 
government that followed the 10-year Popular Front experience 
in 1947. A process of independent reorganising by sectorial unions 
then took place. Shortly after, the least repressed white collar 
State and private sector employees1 unions (CEPCH and ANEF), to-
gether with the Student Federation of the University of Chile 
(FECH), put forward a unity movement which criss-crossed the 
economic struggle against government policies and led to the 
setting up of CUT in 1953. CUT declared independence from 
governments, the employers, the parties and the international 
sphere as well as its effective unity policy, set the basis for the 
socialist-communist FRAP alliance, to be finally set up on strong 
grounds in 1957. Later, it conditioned the emergence of the 
broader Unidad Popular alliance and its accommodation with the 
Christian Democrats to defend the democratic process after an 
attempted coup in 1969. Shortly after another coup threat, 
when Allende won the elections, the Christian Democratic Congress 
representation helped in securing his appointment to office. 
But after 1962, the relative independent stand of CUT vis-a-vis 
the parties lost momentum as the left independent stand in Con-
gress (particularly on the unions' own behalf), and at the presi-
dential elections, won mass legitimacy and the objective conditions 
of having a popularly elected government finally emerged. Thus 
CUT was a key instrument in securing the election of Allende to 
the Presidency of the country. 
Table 2 indicates the evolution of political tendencies 
within the United National Union. 
Table 2 
Political Orientation of CUT Congress Delegates and Votes 1953-72(%) 
1953 1957 1959 1962 1965 1968 1972(1) 1972(2) 1972(2) 
general blue white 
collar collar 
Communist (CP) 21.3 39.9 44.7 31.1 42.3 45.5 30.9 38 22 
Socialist (S?) 
Popular 
de Chile 
Dissidents 
2.7 
4.2 
8.4 
22.9 
3.0 
28.1 28.4 33.1 
3.0 
21.6 
0.9 
26.4 32 19 
Radicals (RP) 6.3 9.0 4.1 6.2 4.8 8.1 3.9 1 7 
MAPU - - - - - - 4.6 7 -
Christian (CD) 
Democrats 6.3 14.7 14.6 17.9 11.9 10.2 26.3 16 41 
Anarchists 7.9 2.2 2.0 2.0 - 1.4* 1.8* 1* -
Trotskyists 0.7 1.3 1.1 0.8 1.0 - -
Independent 6.6 - - 0.5 - - -
Non Classi-
fiable and 
absent 25.6 8.8 5.0 12.9 7.2 9.4 
Source: Alan Angell, Partidos Politicos y Movimiento Obrero en 
Chile (Mexico, Ediciones Era, 1974). p.224. 
1) El Mercurio, Santiago, May 1972. 
2) Alan Angell Political Mobilization and Class Alliances in Chile, 
1970-1973, St. Antony1s College, Oxford, p.30. 
' * MIR 
The following is an autocritical analysis by Luis Figueroa, 
head of CUT during its last 10 years, which can well summarise the 
political limitations unions confronted regarding political 
parties. Figueroa was addressing a UP meeting (London, 1975): 
In the history of our country, many mistakes have 
been made (by the parties in their relations with 
the union movement). The mistake of incorporating the 
CTCK to the Popular Front and in having therefore 
finished it up when the PF was broken up for 
lacking political unity. We made another error during 
the UP Government, by carrying CUT to the Govern-
ment and tightening it up so to speak to the 
overall Popular Government alternative and therefore 
confronting us with the problem of the division of 
the class. The Christian Democrats supported the 
coup because we didn't know how to work with them 
in the unions. These historic errors are paid for 
very expensively. For this reason we must defend 
(our autonomy) with even a greater passion to the 
one we had before, because there is now a lively 
experience going on. Aren't we the leaders of 
the Chilean Labour Movement, the people responsible 
for what happened? Of course, we cannot avoid res-
ponsibility. We didn't know how to maintain our 
independence... In political life, the correlation 
of forces of a society.changes but the instrument 
of a class has a historic projection. 
C. The Structural Basis of Union Politics 
The distribution of Chile's natural resources, of its 
economy and the cultural characteristics of its workers, set the basis 
for the unions' national organising strength and independent 
stand vis-a-vis the State and the Employers. In fact, Chile's 
main and rich natural resources (minerals, in particular nitrate, 
copper ore and coal) are distributed within the northern, central 
and southern regions of the country and since the past century, 
have led to the development of relatively modern capitalist 
enterprise with a certain concentration of workers. Next to 
these centres and the capital city and main port Santiago-
Valparafso region, railroad and port facilities were set up as 
well as the beginning of a native industry and construction 
sector (the former two sectors employed by 1907 as much as 18% 
of the active population) on the basis of mineral exports revenues. 
This process centred the workers on direct class-to-class conflicts, 
in particular in the mining areas which were the basis of the 
country's economy. Under such conditions, miners developed as the 
leading sector of the union movement, on the basis of their strong 
bargaining power but found a stubborn resistance from the part of 
the State and the native and foreign Employers who associated to 
confront them in bloody repressions in order to keep the mineral 
boom going. The cyclical character of a mining-based economy and 
the political repression there pushed many experienced miners into 
other sectors, spreading their radicalism across the country. 
Moreover, Chile's narrow, flat and long territory (3,000 by 
200 miles), and the workers' common language and cultural 
homogeneity set the basis for swift intra-class communications and 
apart from sectorial, cultural or regionally based struggles. In 
fact as early as 1890, strikes broke out simultaneously across the 
country, with workers of different sectors of the economy involved. 
The increased industrialisation that took place during 
and following the Popular Front years was soon controlled by 
American capital and reaffirmed workers' anti-imperialist 
traditions and the consciousness that only through the control 
of Chile's basic resources, industries, commercial, agrarian and 
financial interests, was the country to arrive at a consistent 
development, and its recurrent unemployment, low salaries under a 
soaring historic inflationary process would come to an end. These 
convictions were made clear in CUT's Congress resolutions (in 
particular that of 1968, preceding the setting up of the Unidad 
Popular and its Government). By then a land reform and agrarian 
unionisation process was under way, which linked CUT to a vital 
sector of the workers, thus further increasing its national 
presence throughout the country. 
II. THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE JUNTA AND THE UNIONS 
A. The Overall Economic Policy 
Since the coup of September 1973 the military regime has 
drastically changed the economic policies being pursued not only 
by the Allende administration but by the different Chilean 
governments during most of the last 40 years. More than 450 
State-owned and controlled enterprises were handed over to the 
private sector (basically to the same financial capitalist groups 
which controlled them before 1970).^ However, the military still 
maintain under State (i.e. their) control the most important sectors 
of the economy - copper in particular - representing as much as 
78% of the assets in the 100 largest firms in Chile.* Almost 30% 
of the land expropriated by previous governments under the land 
reform law was given back to private landowners.5 The economy 
was also opened to private and foreign competition by lifting 
price controls and reducing import barriers from 100% to 10% and 
exports were encouraged. As a result, non-traditional exports 
grew from 10% to 30% of the total exports between 1974 and 1978 
(although total exports had fallen by 22% during these years). 
An aggressive policy of reducing public non-military expenditure, 
especially 'social' expenditure, wages and salaries was undertaken, 
which resulted in a decreased inflation rate of 39% by 1979 
a decreased production, especially industrial production; wide-
spread unemployment, in particular amongst blue collar workers, 
and a foreign debt twice as high as that of the 1969-1972 period.9 
All analysts agree that the greatest problem of the Junta's 
growth model lies in its own internal logic, in its inability to 
increase fixed capital investments (which have remained at a low 
10% to GNP during the 1973-1978 period),10 and employment. Open 
unemployment,including the Government unproductive and subsidised 
Minimum Employment Programme,was over 20% by December 1978 (28% 
if we consider all those who would like to work).11 Two impor-
tant efforts to strengthen these policies have been ipade: in 1975 
the 'shock treatment' in public expenditure reductions (under IMF 
pressure and as a result of increased military expenditure) and 
in 1978 through the 'Kelly Plan' presented by the Planning Minister; 
it was based on a scheme aimed at reducing 'labour costs' as a 
means of attracting primarily foreign investment, in order Supposedly) 
to increase employment levels. 
B. Union Struggles at the Economic Level 
Although by 1974 the workers1 share of National Income had 
dropped to almost half of its 1972 level of 63%, and 'labour costs' 
had been reduced from 32% of total production costs to 20.8% from 
1964-65 period by 1977, a 37.5% reduction, real wages and salaries 
and social security spendings had been systematically creeping up 
(not considering the 1975 general depression), as Table 3 indicates. 
It is only within the Government Minimum Employment Programme - PEM -
(based on a completely unproductive sector with an income 60% below 
the official 'minimum salary') that earnings have actually fallen. 
At the time, an editorial by El Hercurio traced the inflation and 
employment problems back to increased production costs due to higher 
real wages, which should be stopped, according to that leading 
Chilean newspaper of the Edwards economic group. 
Table 3 
Index of Real Wages in Chile 1970-78 (1970=100) 
Mass Real Real Real Earnings Government 
Income Salaries Salaries Minimum in the Social 
and Earnings Earnings Minimum Security 
Earnings in Employment Spending 
Construction Programme 
1970 100, .0 101.0 100.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1971 131, .8 125.7 138.8 112.4 170.4 
1972 127, ,8 118.1 160.0 46.4 162.7 
1973 56, .4 51.8 81.0 33.6 69.6 
1974 72, ,4 68.1 59.4 64.2 78.2 
1975 61. ,2 62.5 64.9 100.0 75.7 
1976 70, .5 71.0 100.6 71.9 94.8 83.3 
1977 84, .3 81.7 116.3 84.8 77.2 99.0? 
1978 87.2 85.7 65.6 
(July) (July) (June) 
Calculated by the author on the basis of tables 10,12,15,16,18 in 
Informe Economico, 1970-78.1 Source: INE (National Institute of 
Statistics), Santiago, Chile. 
It seems that managers were going into supposedly increasing 
labour costs given the Government's automatic salary readjustments 
policy and the fierce competition from foreign products. It is 
under these conditions that one can understand the enforcement of 
a new economic plan (the Kelly Plan, later partially enforced within 
Decree Law - DL - 2.200 in June 1978) and political repression (the 
Government's October 1978 DL ban on almost the entire union structure) 
in order to bring about a new capital accumulation dynamic based 
on private investment, which up to that moment had not yet taken 
place. Those policies met with a growing national and inter-
national opposition (including an AFL-CIO and OEIT boycott threat), 
which forced the Government to obtain such objectives through other 
mechanisms, which would apparently comply with union demands; the 
1979 Labour Plan. The increase in real earnings and social security 
spending, and the Government drive to stop it, give a direct indi-
cation of the unions1 independent stand against the current economic 
policy. This is further acknowledged if we consider the relationship 
between general unionisation levels, those unions actively confronting 
the Government by signing open letters on national problems and the 
real salaries and earnings index by sectors, as Table 4 indicates. 
Table 4 
Unionisation by Type of Union and Sector (in thousands, Dec. 1976). 
Its Relationship to Unions Active on National Problems, September 
1976 and Real Earnings (1977) 
Indus- Profes- Agric. Associ-
trial sional Unions ations 
Unions Unions 
Total Unions 
active 
on Nat. 
Real 
Wage & 
Salary 
Problems Index .3 
1970=100 
Agriculture 8 .4 19 .6 282.4 300, .4 21 20 133.I4 
Mining 72, .3 32 .7 105. .0 8 3 88.6 
Industry 154, .9 140 .3 295, .2 21 58 102.2 
Construction 5. .4 53. .7 59. .1 4 6 116.3 
Electricity 5. ,5 10, . 2 15. .7 1 0.3 64.5 
Commerce 4. ,8 96. .7 101. ,5 8 No info. 
Transport 4. ,5 86. ,4 90. ,9 7) 14 No info. 
Services 8. 8 62. ,2 316, .6 387. ,6 30 J 89.5 
TOTAL 234. 5 491. 61 282.4 316. ,6 1,355. ,1*100 100.3 81.7b 
Source: INE: CUT Technical Commission (projections); ANEF (State Employers 
Union) and author's calculations. 
1) These figures include the professional employers union members self-
employed, 55,146. 
2) This category indicates all unions over 600 - which have been confront-' 
ing the Government by means of open letters since 1977, calling for 
economic and political change in national policies, together with various 
specific union demands. 
3) INE, Cited in Informe Economico 1970-78, Tables 14,15,17. 
4) This figure refers to the Minimum Salary Index in Agriculture and is 
possibly higher than the levels actually reached because the Government 
reduced payments in cash to 50% and it is the landlord who establishes 
the cost of the remaining 50% which is paid in kind. 
5) This box indicates the overall real salaries and earnings index. 
Therefore, it was the workers in sectors with the strongest 
and reorganised unions who were able to obtain from their employers 
the periodic salary readjustments decreed by the Government. 
Since July 1979, collective bargaining has been reinstated 
through the Labour Plan and unions in all sectors have increased 
their wage and salaries beyond the rise in the price index, 
obtaining a real increase of between 2% and 16% up to January 
this year, as a study on the matter indicates.15 However, this 
study also concludes that earnings have risen according to the 
market position of each enterprise, and less so compared with the 
strength and militancy of the unions. This is due to the nature of 
the collective bargaining system under the Labour Plan legislation, 
which allows for employers1 lock-outs, the temporary recruitment 
of labour in an enterprise on strike and the 'right1 of employers 
to make the whole work force redundant if after 60 days they have 
not accepted the last offer put forward by the employers. Aston-
ished by the number of unions which have nonetheless gone on 
strike, even though workers would exercise little pressure on the 
employers, the head of the Christian Employers' Association (USEC) 
concluded that 'workers needed a psychological breakthrough'. 
One way to test the union reorganising hypothesis further is to 
look at the differentiated levels of employment by industrial 
sectors where production has been most drastically affected by 
the general economic measures taken by the Government. This has been 
done in Table 5 indicating that the sectors which have had a slower 
degree of employment reductions in relation to reductions in pro-
duction levels, are textiles, furniture, printing, leather, rubber 
products, chemicals, non-metallic minerals and the metal-mechanic 
sectors. On the other hand, the shoemaking, clothing and wool 
industries have had more rapidly decreasing employment levels than 
their corresponding reductions (or growth) of production levels. 
As Table 6 indicates, these two last sectors have weak 
unions and all of the most powerful unions were also active in 
national problems (although they were plant-based), and were 
located in sectors which have managed to maintain unemployment 
as low as possible. However, both the rubber and furniture 
industries have also maintained higher employment levels in relation 
to parallel reductions in production levels and at the same time 
their unions have been traditionally weak and have not reorganised 
to confront national problems. But there are no cases of sectors 
with strong unions and higher unemployment levels. In both of 
these previous cases, however, we are talking of very small sectors, 
and the more general relations that seem to indicate these figures 
stand, even if we control by capital versus labour intensive or 
foreign-controlled industries. 

Table 6 
Wage and Salaried Workers, Unions, Unionisations and Unions Active 
on National Problems in all Industrial Sectors 
where a Decrease in Production has occurred 
Source: CUT, op.cit., pp.62-65, and author's calculations. 
(*) We do not have the means to distinguish among these three 
sectors. 
In such very small sectors (rubber in particular), one or 
two plants seem to be making up the majority of the industry's 
employment and therefore we could be tempted to conclude for 
a whole sector on the basis of one or two plant units (the opposite 
of the ecological - or in this case, the 'sectorial' fallacy). We 
obviously need more detailed plant level analysis. However, unions 
have redeveloped at plant levels during these years, according to 
union officials I have interviewed and to an ILO report, precisely 
by negotiating in the first place for minimum employment levels. 
Salaried Union % Number of % Unions % 
Workers Workers Unionised Unions Active on 
(1967) (1968) (1968) National 
Problems 
Textile 45,000 33,329 74 171 21.0 88 31.0 
Shoes & 
Clothing 38,000 12,867 34 123 15.1 9 3.1 
Wood 
Industry 36,000 5,004 17 59 7.2 8 2.8 
Furniture 10,000 2,772 28 38 4.6 0 0.0 
Printing & 
Publishing 11,800 5,391 48 60 7.3 14 5.0 
Leather 5,500 4,554 83 78 3.4 6 2.1 
Rubber 3,500 23 0.8 1 0.1 1 0.4 
Chemicals 19,500 9,426 49 101 1.44 60 21.1 
Non-Metallic 
Minerals 16,200 13.811 86 63 7.9 18 6.3 
Metal Products 40,500 11,520 29 (89) ) ) 
Electrical , * * ^ 
Appliances 17,300 6,336 44 170U4^ 20.9^ 75 ^26.3 
Construction ( ) ) ) 
of Transport ( ) ) ) 
Metal 32,000 3,036 9 (37) ) (*) ) 
232,300 108,109 814 100 285 97.9 
C. A New Class Structure Arising in Chile? 
Table 7 indicates the structure of Chile's economy and work 
force at its most dramatic stage during the 1975 shock treatment 
process. Agriculture had reached by 1977 a 9-10% GDP level, after 
its own 'shock treatment' of returning to private landowners almost 
one third of the previously expropriated lands. Mining was by then 
up to 12%. Construction and Industry had maintained their 1975 
depressed levels (2.6% and 20.6%) indicating an economic structure 
based on mineral, logs and fruit exports. For 1972 the figures 
for each sector were: 8.5%, 9.2%, 4%, 3% and 26.06%. 
Table 7 
Gross Domestic Product 
Active, Wage and Salaried Population, 1975 (in thousands) 
GDP1 % Active2 % Salaried2 % 
Population Population 
Agriculture 2 396.5 5.7 610.3 20 231.9 11.0 
Mining 3 546.9 8.4 89.7 3 86.5 4.0 
Industry 8 636.4 20.1 528.5 17.6 467.3 22.3 
Construction 992.1 2.4 170.3 5.6 129.2 6.0 
Electricity 606.0 1.4 26.0 0.9 25.0 1.2 
Commerce 13 316.3 32.0 436.0 14.5 210.0 10.0 
Transport 1 628.5 7.0 199.7 6.5 160.0 8.0 
Services 8 967.9 26.0 939.6 31.3 795.0 38.0 
Total 42 091.0 100.0 2999.8 100.0 2104.9 100.0 
Sources: 1) ODEPLAN (in Boletin del Banco Central, Feb. 1978). 
2) National Employment Survey of INE. 
But as previous tables also indicate, the productive sectors 
of the economy as well as the wage and salaried population, the 
workers and proletarians, have maintained a key role in the 
economy, supported by a very high unionisation level throughout the 
economy. 
Among the unemployed in Santiago 61.2% were manual workers, 
28.7% were white collar workers and 10.1% were self-employed. There 
were no unemployed employers. These figures indicate an impor-
tant reduction of the employed population with real unemployment 
running at a 28% level - without considering the underemployed and 
the 10% who have left the country. This has affected especially 
manual workers. However, whatever the drastic economic changes 
which are taking place in the economy, wage and salary earners are 
still the most important single and combined strata in the country. 
Table 8 
Employed Population by Strata (%) 
Employers Unpaid Self Workers Employ- Salaried 
Family Employed ees 
Members (A) (B) (A+B) 
Employed Population 61.6 87.1 687.9 1,226.4 961.1 2,187.5 
(and %) 2% 3% 23% 41% 32% 73% 
Source: INE, 1976. 
Among the employees (which is a census and legal category), 
there are many productive workers (skilled workers) which could raise 
the proletarian section to as much as 50% of the employed population 
(considering agriculture, mining, construction, transport, public 
utilities workers). Moreover, the wage and salaried population had 
at the moment of the greatest depression in the economy a well 
established basis throughout the country (Table 9). Nonetheless, 
the Junta has created a reserve army, which employers are training 
according to their manpower needs, which they can effectively use 
to divide the class and the people. We do not find any significant 
trend in the economy or in the decisions of the ruling bloc to 
change the present capital accumulation pattern of the country. The 
development of a mining and agro-business economy and the depression 
of Chile's traditional productive and service activities, plus the 
development of an import sector of consumer goods, on the basis of 
huge unemployment, is and seems to be the pattern that the economy 
will follow during the years to come, unless the regime itself is 
changed. 
Table 9 
Wage and Salaried Population by Regions 
Region I-IV R.M. Valparaiso VI-VII VIII IX-X XI-XII 
North Santiago San Antonio Central Central-South Sth. Ext.Sth 
Wage & 
Salary 9% 39% 11% 12% 13% 14% 2% 
Earners 
Source: INE, 1975. 
D. The Unemployed and the 'Unemployed Workers' 
Given that the weight of the workers within the employed 
population has been affected to an important extent, we must 
pay due attention to the unemployed, in particular those who were 
employed before the coup and were an integral part of the workers' 
economic structure. It is here that the workers' movements have 
actually been weakened in their very support basis. To what 
extent have they managed to organise and/or maintain their union 
bonds? 
We do not have any indications that workers in the 'Minimum 
Employment'(PEM) Government unproductive programme for the 
unemployed, are organised at all. There is only some indication 
that both the permanently unemployed and the workers who lost their 
jobs after the coup (unemployed workers) are organised. The first 
group is based in the different Chilean Counties (municipalidades) 
and receive 60% of the minimum salary. This over-economic stress 
seems to be the main reason why PEM workers have notorganised. The 
Government seems to understand this fact and has therefore been 
consistently reducing their salaries and earnings since 1973. 
(See Table 3). The permanently unemployed, who during the UP 
Government reached a level of only 3%, have not organised at 
all, although they do seem to join the local popular dining rooms 
set up by the Church in the s l u m s . T h e unemployed workers have 
organised a labour exchange system (bolsas de cesantes) in the most 
important industrial areas of Concepcion, Santiago and Valparaiso. 
In Santiago, they have even formed a 'coordinating body' of such 
bolsas and have addressed critical letters to the authorities. 
However, they seem to be very weak. In east Santiago, for example, 
there are 22 such bolsas, but these comprise only 630 persons of 
a total unemployed population of about 30,000, and seem to be the 
most militant among the u n e m p l o y e d . 
Another point to be made is related to the labour 
market ana its characteristics during these years of a complete 
free market economy experience. It has been suggested that in 
broad terms or in specific cases, there are distinct labour markets 
by type of capital; at least two specific kinds of markets. One 
supplies the labour for the capital intensive enterprises, is 
based on the skilled labour force and is less competitive; the 
other is based on unskilled and semi-skilled workers and supplies 
the traditional, labour-intensive, enterprises; it is competitive 
and open. Moreover it has been also suggested that such markets 
under the present situation in Chile, are quite differentiated and 
segmented; one based on skilled labour having hardly any change 
at the present, because these enterprises do not suffer the effects 
of the economic depression which followed the new economic policies; 
while the other, based on the unskilled and semi-skilled labour 
force, grew to the utmost. Therefore the policy changes have 
affected only the traditional sector of the economy. 
The information presented in Table 5 indicates that the 
depression has affected both traditional and modern industrial 
sectors and, as has been pointed out elsewhere, food products 
have almost maintained production levels and are based on small-
medium size, most of the time labour intensive plants. Moreover, 
if we compare employment levels before (1972) and after the coup 
and between the 1977-1978 years in capital intensive enterprises, 
we find that they have fallen 21%,and another 3.4%. Within 
textile and metallurgic capital intensive enterprises (which 
represent about 50% of such enterprises), employment fell by 
40% in the 1972-78 period.23 It seems that in the case of Chile 
during these years we can hardly speak of differentiated labour 
markets, one of them being relatively close and the other open. 
There is, it seems, only one large labour market where we can find 
an engineer working for some hours as a chewing-gum street salesman, 
an unskilled worker turning up to do whatever is asked for at the 
'Minimum Employment', and a housewife who has just started to look 
for a job. 
The burden of unemployment however, as we have already noted, 
has fallen upon manual (61.2%) and white collar (28.7%) workers. 
The professional classes can more easily leave the country. 
We must also consider that unemployment in Chile is a shared 
phenomenon; it is not an individual problem. The unemployed will 
move into the house of a relative who is employed 'until he finds 
a job' which can take years... This fact as well as our earlier 
discussion is important in terms of the wider cohesion among 
different sectors of the employed and unemployed working class. 
We do not find major breakdowns within the class on these terms, 
because the economic policies have affected every sector of the 
labour force and they seem to react correspondingly. 
In the open letters signed by the different Union Councils, 
the problems and interests of the unemployed, including minimum 
employment, are permanently stressed. In October 1977 a special 
open letter on the issue was put out by the left wing Federation's 
'Coordinator' and the Santiago Unemployed Coordinator. 
This fact and the unions' general rejection of the present 
capital accumulation model being enforced by the Junta and the 
alternative policies they have permanently advocated, including 
the protection of State-owned industries, native capital more 
generally and a new democratic regime and direction of the economy 
where they demand to play a key participatory role in the running 
of the economy, indicates a political approach developed by the 
unions during the years of dictatorial rule, to confront their 
problems and the country's own development. In an open letter to 
General Pinochet on May Day, 1977, 126 unions stated: 
The historic demand of the union movement has been, 
is and will be the construction of a democratic 
regime, based on the capacity of the organised 
workers, capable of constructing a society where 
the power, wealth and culture meet in the hands of 
the majority f 
By September of that year, after four years of military 
government, 479 unions signed another open letter to Pinochet 
calling for a new economic and political regime for Chile, and 
in May and September 1978, the main union bodies called for alter-
native policies for the country. On May Day, 1979, the four main 
National Union Bodies (CNS, FUT, Group of Ten and CEPCH), united 
to confront the regime once again: 
We want to say to the Armed Forces...that the re-
volution that they are carrying out is not on 
behalf of the majority of the people but for a 
minority; that it does not serve the poor but the 
rich. We are not against economic efficiency, nor 
in favour of 'State Paternalism'. But we support 
each policy which has been thoroughly studied and 
applied with a clear understanding of its impli-
cation over human beings, not objects or figures... 
We do not want to forget all the deficiencies 
that have been found before in our country. But 
we also do not want to forget what we were able to 
achieve and conquer and that we have now lost. We 
do not want to live in the past, but neither do we 
want a retracted future. 
The economy must serve man and not man the economy. 
Why must we Chilean workers accept being the victims 
of an ideological liberal-manchesterian dogmatism, 
that the Military are by every means trying to impose? 
...Chile is by no means a blank page on which any 
fanatical ideologue can write his experiments with 
the blood and pain of the whole of the people. Chile 
has its own history, and a soul, and in it have 
been written the aspirations of justice, liberty 
and equality. It can be repressed by force, and 
unfortunately it has been, by the power of the 
weapons that the Chilean Nation entrusted to the 
care of its armed and police forces; but it cannot 
be silenced within the soul of any just man of good 
faith...And if the leaders of the workers would 
accept through cowardice or incapacity this situ-
ation, it would be the grass roots of our own move-
ment who would make themselves heard and our sons 
and daughters who would claim, Justice!! 
III. THE LABOUR POLICY OF THE MILITARY JUNTA AND THE UNIONSy 
RESPONSE. 
A. The Junta's Labour Policy 
1. The First Period 
The first period after the coup is characterised by the 
massive economic and political terrorising of workers, killings 
and imprisoning of well known union leaders at different levels 
of the movement. According to an ex-DINA agent, a special unit 
for this purpose was set up in the Santiago Tacna garrison. 
A well known conservative American union analyst stated, after 
being in Chile, 
a considerable, but unknown,number of labour leaders 
were shot, particularly in some of the mining areas. 
In some cases, rank and file workers were shot - as 
when ten at the San Bernardo railway workshops near 
Santiago were picked out at random and were executed.25 
and we could continue enumerating, in San Antonio, Laja, San Jose 
de Maipo, Buin, and many other places. During this period, 
real salaries and earnings were reduced by an impressive 50% when 
prices were set free, by December 1973 (from 118.1% to 51.8%. See 
Table 2). 
The Junta attempted during the days of the coup to appease 
workers by claiming that the Military will not be a return to the 
past, near or remote. The Armed Forces are part of this noble 
people and never will betray[them]. Chilean worker, the Armed 
Forces will respect your rights!1 General Leigh promised workers 
a share in the profits of enterprise. At the same time, CUT 
was banned as well as the (vital for the Junta's ideological 
objectives) Teachers1 Union, SUTE and other specific plant and 
agricultural unions in some southern provinces. The alternative 
National Union Council set up by the Christian Democrats to fill 
the vacuum (supported by left-wing national union leaders), was 
not at all encouraged by the new Government. Another Decree Law 
(No. 133) blocked the channelling of union funds received by CUT 
to any such union council. The most important legislation prior 
to the 1979 Labour Plan, aiming at finally freezing, infiltrating 
and controlling all union activities, was Decree Law 198. It 
becamethe main policy instrument of the Government's new relation-
ship with the union movement. Published on December 29, 1973, it 
recognised all unions and union leaders existing at that moment 
and established that unoccupied positions be filled via the 
nomination of the older workers of a given union. Likewise, it 
recognised all National Union Federations, Confederations and 
their leaders and allowed unions to meet under police supervision, but 
only for purposes of information. However, this instrument became 
a vital resource legitimising the reorganisation process of unions 
at different levels during the following six years. At the economic 
level, a similar union demobilising policy was undertaken (at union 
demand) by decreeing, as from 1974, national wage and salary re-
adjustments every 3 or 4 months covering all sectors, while at 
the same time allowing for massive lay-offs as the economy turned 
again to the rule of the market forces and opened up to foreign 
competition. 
2. The Diaz-Estrada Approach 
The first attempt to institutionalise a new union structure 
and labour relations system was undertaken in 1975 by Labour 
Minister Nicanor Diaz Estrada, who was subsequently ousted. 
It consisted of three main legal proposals: 
a) The enterprise social status: The proposal intended to create 
enterprise committees in all those which had more than 100 workers 
(or in some cases, between 25 and 100), consisting of three or more 
workers depending on the size of the enterprise. This committee 
had only an information right on the running of the firm by 
meeting with the manager once a month; it also had a representative 
within the enterprise board and a system of profit sharing was 
envisioned. 
b) Blueprint for a New Labour Code: It abolished the previous 
distinction between obreros and empleados; it established a new 
union structure, sectorial based and organised by regional union 
units; at the plant level, only union delegates were recognised; 
each region could have more than one union if it represented more than 
25% of the region's workers; unions could organise themselves into 
federations and confederations but could not unite into a national 
union council. The project also established a system of collective 
bargaining by sectors - federations and confederations - and 
limited to an important extent the right to strike in so-called 
'strategic' sectors and where the strike affected the economy... 
Labour referees could intervene over labour disputes. 
c) Project for a Basic Law Reforming the Social Security System:its 
objective was a greater participation of all workers in such a system, 
but they could 'delegate their financial functions to cooperatives 
and other institutions'. The system would be financed by workers, 
employers and the State, departing from other proposals being put 
forward (i.e. Leniz a high official of El Mercurio, and ex-Minister 
of the Economy ). It would secure every worker's basic needs and an 
unemployment bonus amounting to 85% of his income during the 
previous six months. However, retirement age would be raised to 
65 years for men and 60 years for women, in line with European 
countries (although life expectancy in Chile is much lower). 
Diaz Estrada had an open-door policy towards leaders of 
national union federations and enjoyed especially good relations 
with the Group of Ten who had been appointed by the Government to 
represent Chilean Unions at the annual ILO meetings, where oppo-
sition to the Junta had been mounting up. Apart from the strategic 
Copper Confederation to which he had nominated the most collabora-
tive union leaders, the Labour Ministry had abstained from direct 
interference in union activities. Moreover, it had accepted a 
two-month open discussion by the unions across the country on the 
content of the new proposed labour code, and had openly opposed 
those who wanted a permanent ban on strike activities, indicating 
that it was a fundamental union right and insisting that the 
workers' historic achievements, as declared by the Junta at the 
moment of the coup,were to be safeguarded. However, the Minister 
conceded to employers an end to the privilege empleado status. 
Under heavy union opposition from all sides and confronted by 
heavy opposition from the more authoritarian sectors of the 
Government, he was eventually forced to resign in March 1976. 
Later in 1978, Diaz Estrada, the Air Force representative in the 
Junta and all except two of their branch Generals were retired. 
3. The Purely Authoritarian Policy which also Failed 
The new Labour Minister, Fernandez, closed all doors of his 
Ministry to the leaders of the union movement, made it clear that 
strikes would no longer be allowed in Chile, and, on the basis of 
the Copper Confederation, set up a collaborative National Union, 
UNTRACH, which, together with the Government-appointed union 
representative in the State Council, Medina and CEPCH, started 
representing the Government in the annual ILO meeting and others 
periodically called by Pinochet, UNTRACH was made up also by 
parallel, unrepresentative federations created by the Government 
in sectors where collaboration had been rejected by the union 
leadership. Fernandez and the Minister of Planning, Kelly, enacted 
a further three sets of legislation, after those proposed by 
Diaz-Estrada had been set aside. 
a) The Statute for Training and Employment: This was to adapt the 
workers to the technological progress and change in the economic 
structure, in accordance with the principles upheld by the 
Government... and 'change the mentality and attitude of Chileans' 
in order to arrive at an integration of all individuals and 
classes. Its purpose was the 'preparation of genuine professional 
union leaders and not puppets of the political parties '. The 
Government would finance these programmes to an important extent. 
The State handed over most of its polytechnics to a Private 
Development Corporation, directed by all the major sectoral 
business organisations and assisted them, through the Government 
National Training and Employment Service created under the new 
Statute, with 2.5 million dollars in 1977, in training 95,000 people 
and with a growing sum of money in the years that followed. The 
object was to give basic training to the unemployed and those 
seeking their first j o b . T o g e t h e r with these initiatives, the 
Government started a National Union Training School (which signed 
a major agreement with a Bavarian Foundation headed by right-
wing Christian Democratic leader Herr Strauss), to train union 
leaders according to the new Government orientation. 
b) Decree Law 2,200: Its declared objective was to increase 
employment levels by attracting new investment. It was a basic 
reformulation of Vols. I and II of the Labour Code, by which 
workers were deprived of many rights regarding their employment 
security and including the right of the employer to terminate 
a contract unilaterally, without any justifiable reason and, when 
justifications were found, indemnity would be reduced signifi-
cantly and affect both union leaders and pregnant women, who up to 
that moment had been given immunity; enterprise profit 
sharing would be abolished; labour time would be a minimum of 48 
hours per week and overtime would not be fixed in relation to such 
a limit but in relation to what had been agreed in the labour 
contract; layoffs would be raised to 10% of the work force 
per month and a system of apprentice contract would be established 
for children between 14 and 18 years, who would receive 60% of 
the minimum wage. Such a system is well coordinated with the 
technical training policies for those looking for their first 
job, and the securing of a new, young, cheap, specialised labour 
force, according to the requirements of specific employers and 
without working class experiences. 
c) The October 1978 Decree Laws (Nos. 2345, 2346, 2347 and 2376): 
The objectives were to declare illegal the six most political 
national federations (Mining, Metal, Textile, Construction and 
two Peasant Confederations) for having fa clear Marxist orientation1 
and being 'against public order and the security of the State'; 
to ban all organisations which act in union affairs without having 
legitimate legal registration; to give special power to General 
Pinochet and the Interior Minister to expel any civil servant 
without consideration to any previous law restrictions; and to 
create a new totally plant-based union structure, eliminating all 
previously existent plant and interplant unions and replacing them 
by plant workers' unions and prohibiting the right of all non-plant 
based unions to engage in collective bargaining (i.e. federations) 
and receive fees from their affiliated u n i o n s . 3 2 Vasco Costa, 
by then Labour Minister,was forced to resign in December 1978 in 
the face of total opposition from the unions (including UNTRACH) 
and the threat of an international boycott by the American AFL-CIO 
and its regional branch, ORIT, with the backing of all other 
major international union organisations. A new Minister, Pinera, 
coming from the very heart of the financial community, was sworn in 
and announced a new 'Labour Plan'. 
4. The Labour Plan: an Attempt to Institutionalise a Labour 
Relations System. 
Since 1979, three major sets of legislation hare been enacted 
on the issues more widely demanded by all union sectors (on the 
basis of the previous general governmental agreement with the 
AFL-CIO, which had ended the threat of a boycott). 
a) Decree Laws 2,544 and 2,545: These allowed for free meetings of 
unions within their own headquarters, without previous authori-
sation by the police; this legislation was again rejected because 
of a majority of unions without offices of their own would be 
precluded from holding meetings without obtaining such permission. 
This legislation was again modified,when in April 1978, union 
demands on this issue were finally accepted. The decrees also 
gave the 'right' to join and disaffiliate from unions, federa-
tions and confederations 'freely' and to pay union fees on a 
voluntary basis.33 
b) The presentso-called 'Labour Plan': The Plan announced in 
July 1979 granted unions the right to establish new 'workers' 
unions' without special authorisation (excepting dockers, 
maritime workers, civil servants and members of the judiciary, 
parliament, and enterprises associated with the Defence Ministry); 
to affiliate or not to a union or federation, as well as the 
right for plant workers to bargain and strike. A union could be 
set up by plant, on a multi-plant basis or by sectors with a 
minimum of 10% affiliates; only members of unions would pay dues; 
unions could be later banned by the initiative of the employers, 
the Government or union members, if the labour courts decided to 
do so - these courts were replaced later by civil courts - and 
collective bargaining could be undertaken only at the plant level, 
with unions or federations not being allowed to participate as 
such in the bargaining process, but an 'enterprise workers 
committee' which, like the employers, would be advised by three 
persons. Workers would be able to go on strike if 50% of them 
decidedto reject the last offer by the employers, and if after 
60 days no agreement had been reached, they must either accept 
the employers1 last offer or leave their jobs. Employers, in 
the meantime, would be able to stage a lock-out, or contract 
new labour to keep the enterprise working; workers would not 
receive any salary while on s t r i k e . 
Once again, the Labour Plan was rejected by all union 
sectors including UNTRACH (excepting a small sector of it based 
on the parallel federations which left to form a new Union 
Council called the National Union of Workers - CNT - with no 
important union following). The net result of the Plan was that 
the four main union bodies - not including UNTRACH - finally 
united for the first time into a national Command for the Defence 
of Union Rights. 
In my understanding, the four stages of Government union 
policy are the consequence of 1) the growing union reorganisation 
and opposition; 2) the changing correlation of forces in favour of 
the authoritarian military sections (those more closely identified 
with Generals Contreras, ex-head of the DINA,and Pinochet), and the 
key private monopoly-financial groups; and 3) the external 
opposition from the international unions and the democratic world 
community. 
The Diaz-Estrada policies reflected the influences of 
technocrats within the University of Chile's DERTO (ex-INSORA) 
labour relations school and those of the right-wing Christian 
Democrat (CD) union specialists, headed by William Thayer (ex-
Labour Minister in the Frei administration, member of the Council 
of State created by Pinochet and of the board of the AFL-CIO's 
American Institute for a Free Labour Development). In fact his 
labour proposals in the 1960s (which were implemented only in the 
countryside and in the sectorial bargaining system that the Frei 
administration finally allowed) and Thayer's wider views on 
labour issues, are almost totally incorporated into the 1975 labour 
legislation.^ This type of orientation has a certain continuity, 
with the influence of the Spanish Fascist Falange upon the Chilean 
Falange, which later became the CD Party. Thayer became also a 
member of the special commission which advised Pinera just after 
he took office, because of his good relations with the AFL-CIO. 
The 1975 proposed legislation is the nearest we can find to a 
fascist type of legislation, based on State-controlled national 
unions, a relatively effective social security system and an 
integration of labour and capital at the plant level, under a strong 
Head of the Plant. The third period demonstrates all the authori-
tarianism in its openly repressive expression; while the Labour 
Plan policies seem to indicate a much larger influence of the 
dominant financial interest. In it, all workers' formal petitions 
have been legislated upon, while, at the same time, employers can 
use these for their own purposes, in particular the use of the 
huge labour market to set workers against unemployed ex-workers. 
A good example is a Concepcion lumber union which had recently 
voted to go on strike. When they saw that the company (a major 
exporter) had camped and was feeding 100 unemployed men just in 
case they actually commenced strike action, the workers decided 
against a strike, A further indication of the direct control 
exercised by these financial groups upon labour policy is the 
announcement that the Government is planning to legislate, 
finally, during 1980 on the social security system, whose finan-
cial administration would be handed over to precisely such groups. 
Social Security benefits during the Allende period had risen to 
above 10% of national income. However, the Labour Plan (with its 
biased 'eeonomistic1 repressive approach) has not been sufficient 
to put down the plant- and national-based labour unrest which 
followed its implementation. In February 1980, the Interior 
Minister announced two new D.L.s (3168 and 3177) providing for 
the internal deportation of political dissidents and the trans-
formation of political offences into crimes. In particular, the 
legislation followed the public and well publicised celebration 
by the national union Command of CUT's 27th anniversary... 
B. The Unions1 Response 
1. Reorganisation by Plant, Strata and Type of Union 
The September 1973 coup was followed by a wave of economic 
and political repression; but shortly after, union activities 
re-emerged. According to an ILO report on union freedom in Chile 
written at the end of 1974, 
Many union leaders were eliminated by death, 
execution, imprisonment, dismissals from jobs or 
union positions; were not allowed to continue ful-
filling their duties, were exiled or disappeared. 
The ILO report also concludes : 
However, one third of the union bodies were 
occupied by leaders elected during the previous 
administration; 50% had a mixed representation 
and just less than 20% were newly appointed 
officials. 
Therefore, between 50% and 75% of the plant level union 
officials had remained in office and a smaller proportion in the 
case of union federation (sectorial) leaders. 
Generally speaking, but not in every case, 
union meetings can be held, and depending on 
each case, a representative of the (police) 
authorities is present, although this is less 
frequent today than during the first 4 months 
after the change of regime. 
The unions, apart from presenting the employers 
with individual demands and cases, also discuss 
in many plants, on an informal basis, more gene-
ral labour issues, obtaining in many such cases, 
some benefits, including salaries. At a national 
level, different federations and confederations 
have the opportunity to meet Ministers in order 
to discuss with them the problems affecting 
workers within their sectors. However, other 
important organisations believe that these 
relations are ineffective, because of the 
general attitude of the authorities. 
The Commission has established that many base 
organisations - with the exception of certain 
sectors - continue to exercise some activities 
in particular on social welfare and in relation 
to the every day life of the plants. 
Our interviews also indicate, in accordance with the ILO 
report, that unions have been active at the plant and other basic 
union units throughout the period previous to the reinstatement of 
collective bargaining. The main issues on which they did so were 
the employment problem and the recognition of the union as such. 
Unions overwhelmingly used D.L. 198 for their own benefit, although 
since 1977, once they were reorganised, they have systematically 
asked for its repeal. The way by which they achieved this during 
the first period after the coup, was by becoming active on behalf 
of their members on the key employment problem, which was a vital 
issue during the first years (as still is the case today). 
They re-emerged playing a concrete role vis-a-vis the employers 
and the Government and got the backing of their rank-and-file 
members as they achieved some concrete results within the 
limitations of the new political situation that had been created. 
The search for a minimum employment level was achieved 
by developing workers1cohesion, away from intra-class competition: 
In many cases union leaders1 legitimacy re-emerged after the coup 
by proposing massive workers1 holidays during certain days in 
the month and therefore reducing the total number of workers 
laid off, all of them sharing at the same time the lowest salaries 
which resulted from a reduced working month. Later the 
unions could engage in unofficial and informal bargaining 
activities on salary readjustments by again making use for their 
own advantage of the periodic salary readjustments decreed by 
the Government. But, as we have seen, it was those sectors which 
managed to reorganise themselves to a greater degree that achieved 
a better implementation of these salary readjustments and maintained 
the lowest possible unemployment rates. Moreover there is a direct 
relationship between the most reorganised sectors and the repres-
sion of individual unions and sectorialfederations (Table 12). 
In fact, the six federations outlawed together with their plant 
based unions (two peasant unions, mining, construction, textile 
and metal), are in fact the most reorganised sectors, and the 
most proletarian sectors of the union movement. But the 
repressive October 1978 measures affect more generally the 
whole of the union movement and indicate the extent to which 
all of it had re-emerged and bargained, with the support of the 
National Federations and National Co-ordinating Councils. 
Qualitative analysis on reorganisation by plant size (which 
unfortunately cannot be fully tested because we lack the data 
on the size of many plant unions signing national petitions) 
tend to indicate that large and medium-sized firms are over-
represented, a fact which is consistent with the information in 
Table 6. On the other hand, as Table 10 indicates, manual 
versus white collar workers are represented in general and in 
particular among those sectors which are more politically 
reorganised. 
Table 10 
Unionisation by Strata 
No. of % No. of % % Active on 
Members Unions* National 
Problems 
Manual Workers 476,000 36.6 3,214 48.7 
White Collar Workers 182,000 14 1,462 22.1 
Peasants^ 300,400 23 1,200 18.2 
Civil Servants 
(including SUTE) 316,600 24.3 257 3.9 
Mixed Unions 29,500 472 7.1 
Self-Employed 55,100 2.1 697 
80% 
J v 20% 
* TOTAL 1,304,400 100% 6,600 100% 100% 
Only civil servants1 Associations free unions are considered in 
these figures. 
Source: ANEF, June 1977. 
I)INE, 1977. 
Table 11 indicates the over-representation of both peasant 
and industrial unions, in particular the latter, facts which are 
related to the conclusions we have drawn from the previous Table. 
It also indicates the strength of legal unions during periods of 
repression, making it easier for them to reorganise, perhaps both 
because of the previous tighter cohesion of these unions as well 
as the greater legal facilities at their disposal in their fight 
to obtain union recognition. This Table also indicates the capa-
city of even non-legally registered 'free1 unions to reorganise 
under such difficult conditions. 
Table 11 
Organisation and Activity on National Problems 
by Type of Unions. December 1977, 
1. Professional workers' Unions 3,4011 213 35.2 
2. Industrial Unions 1,8291 203 32.0 
3. Peasant Unions 1,2002 94 15.6 
4. Associations, Union groupings, 
Committees, Uniones, and 
other 'free' Unions 2,0003 95 15.7 
TOTAL 9,4304 605 98.5 
Sources: l) ANEF, December 1977 (all ANEF information is based on 
official data of the Ministry of Labour Statistics}. 
2) Calculated by the author on the basis of ANEF and INE 
figures. 
3) INSORA, Trayectoria y estructura del Movimiento Sindical 
Chileno (by Jorge Barria), Santiago, 1963. 
4) This figure does not include more than 75 National 
Union Federations (see F. Zapata, Federaciones y sindi-
catos en el sindicalismo chileno, International Institute 
for Labour Studies, Geneva, 1970, pp. 5-8. 
Our information indicates that, after a period of very 
difficult conditions and as unions were reorganising and acquiring 
a national presence, even within the Government-controlled media, 
the problems that workers were experiencing at the economic level, 
further pushed them to reorganise. In many cases, unions have 
been keeping their organisations going for more than two years 
after their plant went bankrupt. The reorganisation of free 
unions is thus consistent with the Government ban ana threat of 
imprisonment of leaders speaking on their behalf. 
Number of 
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Source: Public statements signed by the different Union Councils and Federations published in the media. 
]) This column includes unions signing petitions when both Councils have made joint statements, but signing with neither 
of the 2 when these Councils sign separate 
statements. 
2) These percentages were calculated by adding the amounts of unions signing public statements with each council and 
dividing them by the total number of unions which have signed petitions on national issues. 
Arrows indicate change in affiliation. 
(*) Banned (October 1978) but active. 
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2. The Fecerational-SectorialLevel Reorganisation 
The National Union Councils, which would later be known as 
the National Union Co-ordinating Committee (CNS) and Group of Ten, 
emerged just after the coup and the dissolution by an early Junta 
decree of the CUT, grouping basically what were (or became, in the 
case of the second group), the National Federations led by pro-UP 
and pro-CD union leaders. 
The Group of Ten acquired an important degree of stability 
during the most repressive stages, by supporting the Government's 
policies for almost a year and representing it in the ILO annual 
meetings (it acquired for this reason the nickname of Ginebrinos). 
Military officers in key Government positions (Bonilla at the 
Ministry of the Interior and Diaz-Estrada in the Labour Ministry) 
were supporting them. But soon, as the CD party's strategy of a 
quick return to a controlled democratic government under their 
leadership, (once the left had been 'wiped out') failed, their 
union leaders started to move, with the party, towards the opposi-
tion and publishing critical open letters on the Junta's union 
p o l i c i e s . 3 8 As they began to be attacked more thoroughly by the 
Government because of these stands> they began to establish links 
with the AFL-CIO American Union, as a means of protection against 
eventually following the same fate as the Army officers who had 
been backing them. The Americans had been eagerly looking for 
such a base within the Chilean Union Movement (as they historically, 
but without success, had always tried),39 and were therefore quite 
willing to come up with all the support that was necessary. That 
move caused the CEPCH to leave the Group and develop its histori-
cal 'independence' vis-a-vis political in-fighting with interna-
tional intervention in this case, and restored to its even more 
traditional, strictly 'union problems' and a struggle on behalf of the 
white collar workers whom they represent.^ 
UNTRACK was Government-sponsored and based on the Govern-
ment-controlled Copper Confederation; but on the occasion of 
the October 1978 decree law and finally after the Labour Plan it 
totally abandoned the Government. 
FUT was set up under the sponsorship of the Regional Chris-
tian Democratic Unions - CLAT - and expresses a more left-leaning 
union orientation than that of the Group of Ten. 
All National Union Councils have usually united as from 1978 
to confront the Government on Labour Day and when new labour 
legislation has been enacted. In July 1979, four of them, with 
the tacit support of UNTRACH, formed the Command for the Defence 
of Union Rights to oppose the Labour Plan. 
Although union federations from different sectors tended to 
fluctuate in the past from one union group to another, as the 
arrows in Table 12 indicate, and therefore a union sector's 
affiliation with a group could be more conjunctal than structural 
(permanent), there seem however to be some more general underlying 
factors accounting for such affiliations. In general terms, the 
newest sectors, those which have a weak economic base and are 
made up of weak unions, and those penetrated to a greater extent 
by the State, tend to be more associated with moderate union 
bodies; as opposed to the federations with more class experience, 
stronger, and which have traditionally confronted private and 
foreign monopoly capital supported by the State. 
There are some main characteristics associated with this 
latter category of unions (cns). 
A) they represent the most 'proletarian1 (versus white collar 
and/or non-productive) union sectors, which provides them with a 
strong class identification; 
B)they are all sectors and unions developed more than forty years 
ago (except for the agricultural unions, which, although existent 
since before the 1920s, did not massively develop until the mid-
19608), and in some cases (miners) going back to the 19th century. 
Therefore they carry with them radical experiences of various 
kinds (including those of repression and reorganisation at 
different times); 
C) they work for private capital, controlled mainly by foreign or 
native monopoly capitalists which in many cases are also foreign-
controlled or work for large l a n d o w n e r s T h e y have, therefore, 
been exposed to a direct class--to-class confrontation with key 
economic interests at stake. Their experience with the State has 
been one of repression and bureaucratic control, except on two 
occasions when they enjoyed the backing of the State in their 
demands (but to a different extent in each case, the Popular Front 
and Popular Government); 
D)they are within sectors of the economy that produce vital ex-
ports (mining in particular) and products for internal consumption. 
This fact could have given them a strong bargaining power as well 
as the basis for developing 'national' perspectives to analyse the 
country's key problems and solutions (e.g., where to invest 
foreign exchange resulting from exports; the internal production 
of food, clothing, shelter, etc., for the people); 
E)the enterprises where these unions are set are spread all over 
the country but at the same time concentrated in vital regions of 
the country, Arica and Antofagasta in the North, Santiago and 
Valparaiso in the Centre, and Concepcion and Arauco in the South; 
and in the case of the construction and peasant unions, virtually 
in every corner of the country. Once again this fact reinforces 
the previous point, strengthening their national political per-
spective, and the feeling that the overall solution to the 
country's problems is intertwined with the solution of their own 
problems and that these solutions cannot be resolved without the 
participation of the working class itself, and, moreover, with 
the working class playing the leading role; 
F)finally, these are the union sectors with the strongest histo-
rical articulation with the working class parties. This fact 
should be important5 not only in maintaining their ideological 
strength and ability to comprehend the country's problems and 
solutions, but also important in organisational terms. 
The fact that many of these unions are based on many large 
and medium-sized plants and the intra-class experience and better 
organisational skills associated with it, adds one more element 
to the political development conditions associated with these 
unions. Moreover, the fact that these sectors are based on 
industrial unions of large or medium-sized plants and the legis-
lation control on such unions, such as the frequency of union 
elections, strengthens in the case of Chile almost ideal con-
ditions for highly democratic union structures, as many authors 
have pointed out, including a high turnover of the leadership, 
level of participation and a rank-and-file identification with 
the leadership, as well as a 'militant1 dedication to union 
affairs with hardly any union 'corruption*. It also seems that 
the nature of the electoral process in these unions made it 
easier for a close party-union articulation and in this case, 
the working class p a r t i e s . M o s t important of all, the fact 
that these industrial unions are plant-based transforms them 
into virtually 'workers councils'-type organisations, including 
a system of union delegates by factory sections and departments. 
3. Union Development at the Regional Level 
By the late 1960s as compared with the past, the northern 
region had decreased its relative union importance, representing 
now 16% of unionised workers, with Santiago-Valparaiso carrying 
as much as 56% and Concepcion still with a 13% unionisation 
figure. Magallanes, the extreme south, had also decreased to a 
1% share of these figures. The rest of the country accounted 
already for 14% of workers' union members.^3 But in the final years 
of the Frei period and especially during the Allende government, 
more significant changes (although within the trends of the 40-
year period that followed the mid-1920s) were to take place. 
In fact? as Table 13 indicates, the northern area has again 
decreased its importance within the country's union structure; 
unionisation in Santiago and Valparaiso has apparently grown 
significantly, and the Concepcion region has maintained its share, 
as is the case with the extreme south and the rest of the country. 
But the Concepcion region - where the concentration of the mining, 
steel, industrial, lumber and paper mill plants in a. relatively 
small area, on the basis of both an old (Lota, Coronel, Curanilahue) 
and the most modern industrial proletariat of Chile (Talcahuano, 
Lirquen, Tome)are located - represents as much as 26% of the 
political unions and the rest of the country 16% (which should be 
even higher if we consider the agrarian provinces of Bio-Bio and 
Nuble within the VHI-Concepcion Region) and Magallanes 2%. Still, 
almost half of the politically active unions are in the Capital-
Port area, and as much as 65% of the unions and 50% of the Chilean 
workers. The reason why Santiago has such a large share of the 
union movement must be not only related to the concentration of 
industries, services and commerce there, but also (as is the 
case with Valparaiso and San Antonio) because of the importance 
of the agricultural workers in these areas (20% of the agricul-
tural workers' unions and members were concentrated there by July 
1968). This is an indication of the unprecedented ability of 
the peasant leadership - who signed the open letters - to 
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reorganise themselves. However, no stable and strong regional 
organisations have yet developed; it is the local and plant 
unions and the National Federations and Councils which express 
the main political and organic activities of the Chilean Union 
Movement; as they always have! 
The new strong military-administrative regionalisation of 
the country (See Table 13, first column), and strict control of 
all activities, are both a limitation for the development of 
regional union organisations because of the greater regional 
control over unions they imply as well as a driving force in the 
organic development in that direction in order to express there, 
the political alternative they are searching for at the national 
level. 
IV. PARTY/UNION RELATIONS 
The political orientation of the five parties with the 
main union following (CP, SP, CD, MAPU-O.C., RP) regarding the 
importance of supporting union reorganisation immediately after 
the coup(as opposed to the organisation of resistance committees 
advocated by MIR, MAPU and other parties with a smaller union 
following), was important in the rebuilding of the unions and in 
the rearticulation of these parties with them. In fact, their 
first priority was the rebuilding of the unions, whatever the 
limitations were, just as they had done on previous and similar 
occasions (in particular the CP) and clearly established, in 
the case of the three Marxist parties, the importance of dis-
tinguishing the party clandestine apparatus from the more open 
mass, legal (or at least not illegal) union movement. Under 
such conditions, which implied looser articulations with the unions, 
there was bound to be a more autonomous (perhaps unwanted by the 
parties) class/party relationship away from the orthodox articu-
lation in which unions became the transmission belt between the 
parties and the mass of workers. As a result, there have been 
three main direction centres of the union movement: CNS, the 
American AFL-CIO, and the Government, with the latter being, on 
the whole,unsuccessful, but the Americans somehow more successful 
than during their post-war divisionist policies. 
We cannot identify CNS with the orientations of any single 
party's union commission. In fact CP and SP parties have been 
badly disorganised internally by the repression at certain points 
in time - especially so the SP - but throughout this period CNS 
have continued to follow their previous union policies and taken 
up new and creative initiatives. It is also true that all parties 
within the CNS - including the CD - have experienced union political 
cadres. But this fact speaks very highly of the parties' previous 
development and the ability of their union leaders to maintain 
their policies (mostly the pro-UP leaders), even though their links 
with the party are weak or non-existent at times. 
However, we must not draw easy conclusions from this fact, 
such as that unions and union leaders have reorganised and deve-
loped politically by themselves during these years. During the 
first two years in the case of the SP, the first three years 
of the CP, and throughout the period MAPU-O.C. (and to a lesser 
extent the CD and the RP) have maintained basic levels of arti-
culation with the unions. If this articulation has been uneven 
in the case of each one of them it is because of the differentiated 
levels of repression they have gone through and their clandestine 
organisational abilities. 
The early re-emergence of the federations in the first place 
cannot be understood without the parties being relatively success-
ful in resisting repression - in the case of SP and CP, a very 
fierce and bloody one! When the Junta was successful during a 
period in its attempts to disarticulate these two parties' relations 
with the unions, the international isolation of the Junta created 
by the UP in the exterior, international solidarity and the Church 
role within Chile, meant important reductions on internal repres-
sion because it did somehow neutralise to an important extent 
the Junta's ability to repress union leaders in the way they were 
previously accustomed to do. In fact, CNS union leaders who were 
detained, went from the headquarters of DINA (secret police) direct-
ly into occupying their legal union representations and very few 
of them could be expelled from the country, which was generally 
the case with freed political party prisoners. Moreover, our 
information indicates that the party clandestine apparatus played 
a crucial role in the federation and local union reorganisation, 
especially in key working class districts and federations. In no 
other way can one completely account, for the fact that 605 unions 
were active on national problems by early 1977, especially if we 
consider the plant and local nature of the strongest and more 
working-class based 'industrial' and rural unions. 
Party officials active in Chile were proud to report,for 
example, how in 1975 the political orientations for an open 
meeting in the Province had reached the local union via party 
structure before the national federations' leaders brought this 
same orientation to the local union leaders. The respect for some 
'party-people' has undoubtedly grown during these years. Allende 
set the example on September 11. Many CUT leaders became key 
party underground cadres after the coup, as was the case with 
Victor Diaz and Exequiel Ponce, the heads of the CP and SP. 
Nicolas Lopez, Jaime Donato and others, all of them 'disappeared 
prisoners' today. In the case of the CD union leaders, the 
'pro-unity' sectors of the unions have at times prevailed and the 
party's relationship with the 'pro-Americans' in the Group of Ten 
has been at times rather critical. 
Two further points should be stressed. First, the exact 
forms of party-union articulation. CUT became, after the coup, the 
clandestine co-ordination of the Union Commissions and Departments 
of the parties represented in the union movement which by now is 
called the Union Political Committee. It was at the federations, 
co-ordinations and Union Councils inter-co-ordination, and tohen at 
the Command for the Defence of Union Rights that the real CUT was 
located. On one occasion, when the Ginebrinos and the pro-UP Fe-
deration leaders met during the early period that followed the 
coup and some of the later leaders were worried because CUT 
had no real presence at that moment, someone mentioned (and all 
agreed) that they were in fact the real CUT! One must also 
consider the role of key local-union-party-articulations and 
their role at the regional and sectorial-federation-level. The 
Junta understood this fact when it outlawed both the six CNS fe-
derations and also their local unions. 
Secondly, I would like to stress the new developments in 
the inter-party relations within the union movement and that of 
the unions with the party. One cannot understand the political 
role played by FOCK and particularly that of CUT and the process 
which led to its reunification, only on the basis of a party 
'supra-leaaership', which is so many times mistakenly stressed, 
within a certain 'party chauvinistic' tradition. 
The influence of union leaders on the parties (in some 
more than others), on the basis of their own and direct class 
experience with the State and the employers has now become more 
certain. 
A. Parties and Unions 
Political parties have reacted generally to the party/union 
articulation problem according to their previously prevailing 
orientation and practices: 
The CP, which has traditionally had a party-le4 relationship 
and strong Union Commission directed by the Political Bureau, 
stated (in response to a CUT E.C.1977 document): 'for us Communists 
the concept of union autonomy and independence is referred primarily 
to its traditional enemies.' Furthermore, we do not believe that 
autonomy, and mechanical, non-dialectical independence with the 
political parties which have an influence on the unions, is 
the key condition for the unity of the unions.1 
The SP3 on the contrary, believes that the instrumentalis ation 
of the unions by the parties has arrived at a final crisis during 
the present dictatorial circumstances: 'Political parties have led 
unions to undermine their own strength and means to fight for their 
needs, when they impose their own criteria over them. Political 
parties in present-day Chile, and that is how we see it as the 
Internal Leadership of the Chilean SP, must go out to support 
workers' struggles'. They believe that political parties have a 
role to play in their own sphere;'unions must defend the material 
interests of workers, and their organisations.. .'They therefore 
limit union struggle to their immediate interests. However, they 
called (after the October 1978 union ban and reorganisation) for 
the construction of 'clandestine union nuclei from the grass-roots 
which structure themselves until they set up a great CUT1 (!). 
Thus the non-involvement in politics they advocated by then is 
contradicted by their subsequent (and unrealistic) call upon the 
unions to develop as clandestine organisations, which cannot but be 
very political. " The split Altamirano faction did not yet, by 
mid-1980, have an opinion on this m a t t e r . ^ 
MAPU-O.C., on the other hand, calls upon its different orga-
nisational levels clearly to distinguish the party clandestine 
apparatus and party influenced mass organisations. This is 
because 'the most important and the most essential lesson that 
we have learned in these years of struggle is that there is no 
mass work (of the party) which cannot be directed to the masses 
unless we do this through the (re)construction of open mass 
organisations, formal or informal but legal'. The opinions 
which rise from within the union movement 'must enrich the struggle 
and secure the objectives' set out by the party(ies). This orien-
tation reflects a flexibility to adapt to the new realities, but 
still the predominance of the party in its articulation with the 
union. At the same time, it is in accordance with the party's 
strong union commission and ability to overcome repression and 
restructure itself and help in the restructuring of its union 
following, as opposed to the SP traditional experience of loose 
party/union articulation and the great difficulties it has found 
under the Junta in arriving at a minimum level of union articu-
lation and in receiving a union feedback experience in order to 
best orient its union work and platforms. But this is also due, and 
primarily so, to the much wider repression the SP has gone through, 
compared to, say,MAPU-O.C. and even more so to the RP or CD. 
The F.adical Party's weak union department is counterbalanced 
by the sectorial representation of the union leaders within the 
party. Thus they have been not only more autonomous, but also, 
given the present circumstances, influential on the party's 
orientation. This has nonetheless implied that like the SP and 
CD, RP union leaders have tended to spread throughout the main 
five union councils. 
Christian Democratic union leaders are clearly the most 
autonomously articulated compared with the other parties and 
have now managed to determine or_ their own, the party union policy. 
The CD party leadership has evolved since 1977 towards a political 
orientation and opposition to the dictatorship in accordance 
with the progressive union leaders' demand for unions and other 
social organisations to play the most important role in developing 
a new democratic anti-dictatorial consensus.^ (However, this 
opposition role has changed towards a critical accommodation 
with the regime, after the September 1980 Pinochet-organised plebi-
scite on a new Constitution). 
It appears that the conditions in greater depth that deter-
mine the present party orientations on their relationships with the 
unions are basically; 1) their previous historic articulation 
and views on the subject; 2) the intensity of the repression that 
they have gone through during these years; 3) their organisational 
abilities to (re)link up with their union basis; 4) their specific 
union bases (on the whole parties have tended to remain there); 
5) parties international links. 
On the whole, there seems to be developing today a new 
party-class articulation, provided by the new circumstances but one 
which is not yet assimilated within the 'theoretical framework' of 
the parties, still influenced by the transmission belt approach. 
In fact, more particularly CNS has acted (in the absence of a 
free national press and while party activities are banned) 
as a CUT and as Party mass leadership at the same time and 
has been recognised as such by the masses which they directly 
influence or the whole mass movement when signing common petitions 
with other national union bodies. Since August 1979, the united 
command has been increasingly undertaking such a role. Unions 
are today the only ones with the ability to organise demonstrations 
and analyse the country's problems in the open, appear in the press 
and confront the Government on all kinds of issues which are at 
the very basis of the economic the overall political model Of the 
Junta, and they have done so. This fact can be seen, particularly, 
in the unions' open letters. 
B. Unions and Parties 
In May 1977 the 'union coordinator' (which would later be 
known as CNS) analysed the party/union articulation problem in 
the following way: 'in the past our union movement was forced by 
party politics to take party stands in order to struggle for 
power. It is necessary to recognise this historic fact today 
if we do not want to go back to such a situation. We must learn 
from our errors!' However, it later turned to the capitalist 
system in its inability to solve in a just and efficient way the 
real needs of working people being satisfied as a reason why they 
also searched for party influenced unions. It indicated different 
views on the subject which are present within CNS. Two years later 
in their 1979 May Day open letter, the four main union bodies 
stated: 
Political parties must understand that they are 
expected to modernise their approach, to demo-
cratise their internal structures and undergo a 
deep spiritual and intellectual renewal of their 
leadership, that will allow the emergence of a new 
behaviour, a new style in making politics. A renewed de-
mocracy demands renewed parties and parties' leaders. This 
is a very profound sentiment among Chilean workers and to-
wards that end we invite Chilean political parties to under-
take their great responsibilities without letting the 
Chilean people down. 
The opinion of the CUT E.C. (where the five parties with 
the main union influence are represented) on the subject in 1977 
(and which the CP criticis ed), is that the autonomy and indepen-
dence of the union movement with respect to political parties 
must be a more real one. It is the fundamental condition for 
arriving at the unity of the unions. The same orientation had 
been put forward some months earlier, by CUT E.C. member Eduardo 
Rojas of MAPU-O.C. He believed that there had been an historic 
exhaustion of a certain kind of party/union relation, and called 
for the overcoming of past experiences (in particular those of the 
UP Government) and the development of a new relationship based 
on: the recognition of the specificity of union political action; 
the intra~union ideological struggle under the principle of union 
unity; the development of a new union language which would meet 
hoth an amplitude and tradition criteria; the development of a 
more scientific comprehension of the sociological characteristics 
of the union organisation; a greater unity of the working class 
parties; and the construction of a union structure which would 
guarantee union democracy.This same orientation was put 
forward by Carlos Morales, leader of the UOC peasant confederation. 
He called in Chile upon unions to develop an independent and autono-
mous relation with political parties. 'No party has the right 
to impose its ideology even if it is strong and predominant 
because, in the end, workers will impose their class ideology.' 
In the same way, another leader of UOC, Raul Aravena, called upon 
the national union leadership to'put forward first the interests 
of the workers and not thoseof the political parties in order to 
give a real content (which so far nobody has done) to a democratic 
social project which will respond to the problems felt by workers 
and give comprehensible orientation so that all the workers take 
up an active role in making that new system prevail. 
A similar orientation was put forward by Manuel Bustos, head 
of the CNS and a progressive CD leader, when he stated that under 
the conditions of the Labour Flan, 'workers must unite in order to 
give a political response'. The solution to workers' problems was 
not to be found Vithin the enterprise, but in sufficiently strong 
initiatives which will persuade the military against the economic 
groups'.Federico Mujica, leader of the white collar workers' 
CEPCH, believes that political orientations played an historic 
and positive role, but that the present situation requires the 
subordination of such orientation for a tactical and strategic 
unity of the unions in order to attack unemployment, low salaries, 
and the problem of economic dictatorship1. Without realising it, 
perhaps, he is actually calling, like the others, for a stronger 
political development of the unions. He even calls, for that 
matter, upon unions to develop alliances with other social forces 
and collaboration with the political parties..54 ciotario Blest, 
the CUT President during its first 10 years, believes that unions 
should define their political perspective by seeking a future 
union-based C o n g r e s s . Rios and the Group of Ten more generally 
follow in a more direct way the UP-DC orientation of a party-
controlled democracy with stable majorities, and he advocates 
that unions should be recognised and respected in their corporatist 
(non-political) interests as intermediate institutions between the 
State and the worker. 
At the grass roots level one can also recognise clear-cut 
orientations advocating that unions make a political stand against 
the present situation, that is, among the leaders of modern enter-
prises such as metallurgical or tyre workers - CTI, CORESA, INSA -
but less so in the case of women workers of the more traditional 
Scala textile enterprise, who have recently been on strike. 
There has still not developed among the Chilean labour 
movement a style of direction, by which mass leaders are supported 
in their jobs by the party and are neither left on their own nor 
are under constant control. However, we believe there are both 
the objective historical conditions within the union movement 
and the specific conditions of the present circumstances in Chile, 
that can, in fact, crystallisea new autonomous party/class 
articulation and that, whether the parties like it or not, is 
actually taking place. The result is a wider political development 
of union leaders and yet (or rather as a consequence) they become 
more 'autonomous1, as was the case in the early days of FOCK. 
Today, however, the stage in which this takes place is a different 
and superior one. 
Many union leaders seem to have developed autonomously 
articulated relations with parties, need to develop even more so, 
pressed by the present circumstances which force them to look for 
a political answer to their problems,and seem also well decided 
to never return again to the previous relationship they had 
developed with the parties. In 1975, Luis Figueroa at the UP 
leadership meeting in London stated: 
The CUT is not an organisation which is a base 
of the UP...If the UP wants to meet with its union 
committees it may do so. But that is not the CUT... 
One thing is the political loyalty one has to 
one's party, to an ideology, and another thing 
is an instrument of the unity of the class at union 
level...We want to state this very clearly. This 
does not mean that this (CUT) is a 100% autonomous 
organisation that is run with its own head. No. 
It is run with a political head, through its mili-
tants, but as an institution, it must be an insti-
tution that really functions by its own stand, 
with ivs own head and with its own political line 
which is elaborated by consensus. We agree on 
establishing a co-ordination with the UP and 
tomorrow we will agree to discuss with the CD and 
establish a co-ordination with them...We work in 
that direction...I don't know if I have been 
sufficiently clear. That is the position that 
we have in relation to these problems and we want 
you to understand us. We, as militants of a 
party, respond each one to his party; however, 
as an Institution, we respond to the class. 
V. UNION RELATIONS AT THE SOCIO-POLITICAL LEVEL 
Union political relations go beyond political parties. We 
will analyse those which have been established with the most 
important social and political institutions and their significance 
in the unions1, search for a new democratic order for Chilean 
society. 
A. Employers, the Old Petty-Bourgeoisie and the Unions. 
1. The Employers1 Policies. 
Employers have consistently supported the Junta's economic 
and labour policies. When General Leigh was ousted together with 
90% of the Air Force Generals in 1978, after advocating an 
alternative economic and political system for the county, General 
Pinochet summoned to his office the heads of all the national 
employers federations and received assurances of their support. 
Apart from the protest of ASIMET (the Employers' Metallurgical 
Association), after the Government left the Andean Pact and the 
mild opposition put forward by some of the sectorial federations 
most affected by the end of the import substitution era (such as 
the textile committee), we can hardly find any systematic opposition 
or breakaway employers' organisation from the official employers' 
organisations stand in strongly supporting the Government and for 
that matter, for the present Chilean Regime. The satisfaction of 
the main industrial interests when the Labour Plan was finally 
enforced was immediate. Gerardo Zegers of ASIMET declared to El 
Mercurio after meeting with General Pinochet;, 'the Labour Plan 
is consistent with the economic policy of this Government. We are 
convinced that a market economy is the way by which the country 
progresses and the Labour Plan is consistent with it'. El Mercurio 
itself gave its approval for the Plan, indicating that it had 
'enormous advantages'. One of these advantages, according to 
Darroch, head of the industrial employers association, SOFOFA, is 
his often expressed assertion that collective bargaining should be 
plant-based. 
The Government won the support of even small industrial, 
construction and commercial Chambers, by offering, against union 
protests, an end to the construction federation and its trans-
formation into a labour exchange system, as well as an end to 
the 5.5 day work in the commercial sector. 
The military, internal and foreign monopoly capitalist interests 
alliance's ability to gain consensus over the whole of the capita-
list strata is based and is due to the consistent policy of 
reducing and keeping down workers' salaries and on the other hand 
it is due to their ability to win employers over ideologically to 
the political principles of monetarism and of the free market 
economy. 
However, there is a small and deviant sector of industrial 
employers which has broken away from such a wide consensus. They 
represent intermediate, non-foreign linked industrial interests 
such as Saez, Fluxa and others (something approaching the existence 
of an 'internal bourgeoisie'), which have been completely subor-
dinated economically by the military, the few private financial 
capital groups, and foreign financial interests. They have openly 
called for a return to political (and 'economic industrial') demo-
cracy. It seems that they feel strong enough, vis-a-vis small 
capitalist interests,to confront the Government and yet they see 
no future whatsoever in their ability, under the present economic 
circumstances, to maintain or expand their share in the wealth 
being created. Their political orientation is coincidental with 
that advocated by the CD party and the military dissidents. To 
some extent a small group of Christian Employers (USEC) shares 
those views. 
2. The Self-Employed. 
It is only among the old petty bourgeoisie (or self-
employed workers) organisations, in which some small employers 
participate , that we find any kind of more coherent opposition 
to Government policies resembling those put forward by the unions. 
A so-called 'Small and Medium Enterprises Confederation1 has been 
set up under the leadership of the organisers of the gremios which 
fought against the Allende Government; it has called upon other 
organisations to set up a Command for the Defence of the 3remios 
to oppose the Labour Plan, which would end union activities and 
other Government policies. Vilarin, the main spokesman and head 
of the truck-owners' union, declared that Vith this legislation 
(the Labour Plan) I believe that 95% of all Chileans will be 
against the Government, some from the opposition, others as 
divergents and some as dissenters. We are in a divergent position.' 
He has also strongly criticised the Government economic policy which 
makes the rich richer and the poor poorer? the Government has 
since attempted to break up his union into owners of more and of less 
than two trucks, which he has resisted by calling up a national 
meeting of his unions and gained their support. Similarly, taxi 
owners have staged a mass demonstration against Government policies 
restricting their circulation within the capital city, demanding 
the right to work. We shall fight to the last and will not let 
ourselves be pushed down. We will accept no more humiliations. 
All of us, united in one single block, shall overcome this unjust 
situation.1 Jara, their leader, believes, like Vilarin, that the 
wheel gremio is united in order to fight back as they did under 
Allende. Vilarin openly supported (as he did in July 1973) the 
copper workers' strike at El Teniente in January 1980.^ 
As is the case with the employers, small producers also res-
pond on political but opposite terms, to their objective interests, 
affected by an extremely monopolised, contracted and non-expanding 
economy. However, in the case of the latter, because they do not 
employ workers whom they can exploit, or only very few, (and 
probably coming from their own relatives and friends), they are 
forced into unemployment or to work below subsistence level and 
therefore to confront the Government. 
3. Union Reaction to Employers and the Self-Employed. 
Although unions have called for the protection of national 
capital and small producers in particular in their actual labour 
demands, before or since the Labour Plan, they have nonetheless 
demanded a 50% wage rise for all workers, regardless of company 
size. They have also attacked the economic labour policies because 
these serve, in their words, 'the interests of the bosses'. However, 
in the case of the self-employed, the national unified union Command 
has recently? in January 1980, come out in support of the truck 
and taxi owners, but not before having refreshed their memories 
regarding !those who in 1973 praised you and presented you as the 
most exemplary representatives of patriotism (and) are now per-
secuting, destroying and condemning you to a life style which, 
thanks to your own work, you had managed to overcome many years 
ago1. 
Unions have thus responded to their own objective interests 
when confronting the employers. But regarding their old petty 
bourgeois political enemies, who are now themselves equally unable 
to reproduce their labour force and are thus forced into con-
fronting the Government, they have offered them their support. 
This is consistent with the unions1 objective non-conflicting 
interests regarding this stratum, both at the economic and poli-
tical level. It is also consistent with their own traditions on 
the matter (the Ranquil Peasant Union Confederation, for example, 
organises within its ranks, small farm producers and indigenous 
communities) and their anti-employers and more general pro-Socialist 
orientations. Are unions in a position to develop also concrete 
alliances with sections of capital, beyond the rhetorical and the 
general policy level? Under the present circumstances, it is 
doubtful, because there does not seem to be any section of workers 
which have at least at this stage overcome the subsistence level. 
Under such conditions it is difficult for them to engage in the 
actual practice of forming alliances with sections of capital which 
even if subordinated to monopoly capital, are objectively exploiting 
workers beyond the level they can feed themselves and their fami-
lies . 
4. The Professional Classes and the Unions. 
a) The Government and the Professional Golegios 
This section of the modern petty bourgeoisie participated 
in the mass uprising against the Popular Government and as Allende 
explained to the country on the day of the coup> 'in order to defend 
the privileges that they enjoyed under the capitalist society' . 
Ironically, it was not the UP Government which undermined and ended 
those privileges of academic professionals after the coup. Similar 
actions were taken within the State apparatus. In February 1980, 
the Government again carried out another 'cleaning up' operation 
among the University progressive academics who had since emerged 
there. Another key sector for the ideological control of the 
country by the military, the teachers, saw their union federation, 
SUTE, banned together with CUT immediately after the coup and 
replaced by a more respectful colegio, which developed little if 
any life of its own. Educational 'coordinating' bodies have 
since emerged into the open and have produced wide platforms against 
Government educational policies, while using at the same time the 
colegio as a forum. Physicians have reacted critically to the 
Government reorganisation and intentions to dismantle the Social 
Health Service, which provided them with a secure job, professional 
advancement and training. Young physicians have been even more 
militant and on one occasion took over the colegio headquarters 
to protest against their unemployment. Since then they have 
formally organised to demand their right to work and criticised 
more generally Government policies. As a consequence, the 
Government replaced the Education and Health Ministers by more 
moderate officials. Lawyers have managed to oust well known 
extreme right-wingers from the colegio1s board and resisted the 
removal of progressive members accused of using the profession for 
political objectives. A group of such lawyers who have been 
active on behalf of the unions1 legal defence have formed a union 
of lawyers and joined CNS. Engineers have protested the lack of 
investments and architects have rejected the nomination by the 
Government of board members whom they had not proposed, and thus 
not abiding by a system which the Government itself had established 
after banning the right to free election of their representatives. 
Since then different colegios of engineers, architects and civil 
constructors have formed a defence committee to protect their 
rights. Journalists, who have been the most militant sector 
among the professionals, have rejected the Government's ban on 
their right to elect their representatives and to discuss and 
elaborate their own platforms during their recent convention. They 
have established a 'freedom of the press' committee, and ousted conser-
vative representatives from it, while calling upon the Government 
to allow for the return of the exiled journalists. 
The council of professional colegios, CUPROCK,set up during 
the October 1972 gremios strike, has strongly collaborated with 
the employers' federations, especially in the Development Corpora-
tion set up to retrain the unemployed and the young in order to 
develop a trained industrial reserve army which could effectively 
replace any sector of workers on strike or otherwise. The Govern-
ment has organised an 'arbitrary corps' of 25 members, formed by 
economists and lawyers. Most of them are university professors 
who support the regime. The Corporation settles labour disputes 
in sectors where strikes are banned. The colegios have organised 
their own Confederation, which the Government does not recognise. 
Recently, through D.L. 2516, professionals have been formally 
stripped of their right to fix minimum and maximum fees for their 
services and of their right to allow only their registered 
members to work for the State. Forced as part of the highly 
skilled labour force into the labour market, the confederation has 
declared a 'long-lasting war' on the Government.^8 In 1981, the 
colegios have been finally banned altogether and are now being 
ruled by a 'professionals' Labour Plan. 
Many of the most prestigious social sciences institutions 
have reorganised themselves since the coup outside the University 
and the control of the Government (CIEPLAN, FLACSO) and new ones 
have emerged, such as VECTOR and the Academy of Christian Humanism. 
The most important of these is the Academia or the Cardinals' 
University as it is known, which has organised on a workshop basis 
many of the social science academics who previously formed such 
University Institutes and Departments,including many ex-Chancellors 
and Deans. In 1979 it signed an agreement with FLACSO, after the 
Government withdrew support for it within UNESCO. 
b) The Unions1 Relations with the Professionals 
Union federations first came into the open by holding 
seminars with progressive professionals on the basis of which 
they organised their first platforms. Labour lawyers then started 
to play an increasing role as union activities became more persis-
tent Recently, professionals have become more important in 
existing union activities, as advisers in the newly emerging of-
ficial collective bargaining system, which allows and promotes such 
an advisory role for professionals. Even more important, on 
political grounds, is the development of union technical commit-
tees, particularly within CNS and some of its federations. In 
these bodies, a fluent relationsjiip between union leaders and 
progressive professionals has developed, under union direction. 
Such committees have produced the most important alternative 
socio-economic and political propositions (i.e. the union open 
letters) for the workers and the country's development yet pro*» 
posed in Chile. An even more interesting development has taken 
place between one of the most active of the new progressive social 
scientists' academic and research institutions, VECTOR, and the 
most important proletarian federation, the metallurgical FENSIMET. 
An agreement was signed last year by which VECTOR engages in open 
research in the sector while advising the sectorial unions and 
their plant affiliates on all kinds of socio-economic and 
policy aspects, including collective bargaining and training 
courses which have reached 200 union leaders this far. 
As in the case of the productive petty bourgeoisie, the 
objective interests of professionals and workers at large tend to 
become increasingly coincidental, as both their organisations con-
front the government on an independent stand. This opens up a 
wide perspective for their mutual inter-organisational relation-
ships which are now just starting to develop. For the 
professionals it implies an important source of support in their 
struggle,from a strong ally, and a relationship with a consistent 
class which can project their diffused interests into politically 
significant alternatives. For the union, a source of enlighten-
ment by which they can better systematise their general technical 
and humanistic class comprehension which can be transf6rmed into 
concrete sectorial,regional and national alternative development 
platforms. It also becomes another path for the unions to advance 
in their social legitimacy and penetration into wider social 
sectors. In a more immediate respect it could mean a concrete 
way for unions and professionals to start coming out from the 
defens ive political position, in which the Government has so far 
placed them, by starting to propose concrete and mobilising 
alternatives. The attitude of political parties to this new union 
relationship is most important, because they can help to promote 
it or look upon the relationship with apprehension, inhibit it, 
while fearing 'the contamination of the class by petty bourgeoisie 
ideology'. 
B. The Military and the Unions 
1. Military Interests and Contradictions 
Military interests are met to the extent that their members 
are provided with sufficient arms, supported in their consumption 
demands and the country's external and internal defence is 
secured. General Pinochet has been able to deliver in substantial 
quantities military defence means and those for the personal 
consumption needs at all levels of the military ranks . Internal 
defence has been secured by means of 'policing' the military 
(and equalising the police and the military roles within the 
country and their status within the Junta) and by extending 
the apparatus of the State into every corner of the country (by 
means of regionalising Chile and reproducing within its twelve 
regions a ministerial Cabinet set-up similar to that which exists 
at the national level). Each region was organised in accordance 
with the previously existing internal organisation of the military 
throughout the country and was put under the command of the highest 
military authority. It was a practical application of the National 
Security Doctrine, which sets as the first priority of the military 
the struggle against Marxist, atheist, oriental civilisations and, 
therefore, the enemy within. General Pinochet's recent book 
interview makes this clear on the very first page. 
The Government of General Pinochet, as the many contradic-
tions which he has faced throughout these years indicate, has 
found a permanent opposition within its ranks. Nonetheless, the 
contradictions have never been strong enough to challenge his rule. 
The source of such opposition is not in line with military ranks 
or the army in particular. More generally it has to do with 
a) the existence of a parallel organisation within the armed 
forces and the police, such as the secret police and the personal 
kind of rule Pinochet has enforced (as distinct from the more 
institutional Argentinian, Brazilian, and Uruguayan experiences); 
b)the police kind of role now charged to the military and 
which contradicts its traditional professional role as the 
country's external defence forces(an orientation still predomi-
nant in the Chilean War Academy), as well as the external security 
problem as such. This problem is derived both from the external 
contradictions which result from the internal problem (due to 
the international isolation of the regime) and the difficult ex-
ternal situation with its three neighbouring countries and,up to 
1980, even with the US. Since last year these have somehow 
relaxed because the Pope's mediation, the invasion of Afghani-
stan and the election of Reagan as President of the US have 
diminished the tensions of the Government with Argentina and re-
affirmed fluent relations with the United States (which were 
never undermined at the intermilitary level). However, the 
problem still exists, as was demonstrated in the South East Asian 
countries' unwillingness to receive General Pinochet after his 
first stop in Fiji when he was met with a strong mass protest. 
Pinochet's rule over the military is based primarily on the 
transformation of the military institution into the key capital 
accumulating section of the country for the sake of military and 
personnel needs. The secret police (which has been weakened 
in its role of controlling the population since the banning 
of DINA and its transformation into CNI, but not in its internal 
controlling role within the military) on the one hand and the 
propagation of the National Security Doctrine (NSD) within the 
military high ranks (Pinochet in fact created a special military 
NSD Superior School), are the two other mechanisms he uses to keep 
a strong grip on his rule over the m i l i t a r y . i n this respect, 
the primary political role of the military in Chile is not as the 
party of the bourgeoisie, as it has been called but in the first 
place, as the party of the military themselves. The military 
have capital accumulation interests of their own by controlling 
through the State the most important sectors of the economy and 
therefore their interest in the labour problem is not accidental 
but vital (State enterprises are not allowed to go on strike). 
The present head of the Cabinet,for example,was the man Pinochet 
first elected to solve the labour problem, after union incorpor-
ation mechanisms were dismissed in 1976. The Government thus 
declared 1979 the year of the Labour Plan and 1980 the year of the 
Social Security Reform. 
2. The Union Response to the Military 
A special meeting of the Military High Command (including 
all the generals of the four branches) with General Pinochet 
a few days before the October Union banning and the November 2, 1978 
final date for the negotiations with Argentina decided these anti~ 
labour measures for natioual security reasons (e.g. ban the ' 
'internal enemy' in order to confront,then, the 'external' one). 
The question is: Would this have happened if the unions and 
the UP parties had previously called for the workers' indepen-
dent decision to defend the country's territory if_ invaded (and 
only if), irrespective of which course of action the Government 
decided to take it seems doubtful. The point to be made here is 
that parties and unions were just not taking into consideration 
the military correlation of forces (as the UP Government also 
and dramatically showed). Just a few weeks before this happened, 
CNS lgaders had called for theoverthrow of the Pinochet Govern-
ment. How? With the Masses'. Unarmed masses can well overthrow 
a Government, as Iran has so astonishingly demonstrated (and 
this could well be the case in Chile), but it is necessary to have 
in any case, and even more so in such an alternative, a military 
strategy and programme. None of that was present in any sector 
of the Left during the presidency of Allende, nor it is today. 
This has been a historical problem of the Chilean labour movement 
and unions had nothing that resembled such a strategy: the Ibanez 
or Alessandri Government would fall as a consequence of a massive 
general, non-ending strike, or the Government (and power) would 
be won by elections. And the military? No reasonable answer was 
given to this problem. 
In the open letters of May 1979, the main four National 
Councils dedicated a special section to the military. The let-
ter confronts them, showsthem what they have made out of the 
countrys hov; they have repressed the people and made them hungry 
and calls upon them to understand before it is too late (not for-
getting to mention the Iranian example) that they must stop making 
this revolution for the rich and go back to the barracks. No doubt 
this is a step forward. Again this was repeated in January 1980 
by the Command of Union Bodies. But again, is this enough? If 
they actually went back to the barracks, would they stay there? 
The problem we are interested in dealing with here, is that 
unions have not yet developed any consistent relations with the 
military. This is well associated, with the still relative under-
development of regional union structures compared with the importance 
of the Military State set-up in that sphere and the lack of systematic 
treatment of the problem of the military by the unions. They have 
engaged in ideological confrontations with them. But is that 
sufficient and the most important aspect to be considered today? 
Considering the military interests at stake, it is difficult to 
believe that a purely ideological confrontation with them will have 
any strong effect. The fact that workers were politically and mili-
tarily defeated in 1973 and have since been repressed systematically 
on economic and political grounds by the military, does not allow 
for unions to have any kind of influence over them. At the present 
time, the military do not have any respect for workers. It seems 
that thfe dynamics of a relationship which would have any kind of 
effect should be that of mass confrontation/respect/relations/ 
ideological influence. Such a process would be particularly effec-
tive within regions and sectors where military interests are more 
directly at stake (as in the case of the Chuquicamata 1978 strike). 
At the same time, the kind of economic and political alternatives 
that unions propose for the country is most important, if such 
relations were to be established on a more permanent basis. In this 
respect to advocate under present circumstances their return to the 
barracks and to a parliamentary regime seems no solution for facing 
a realistic democratic transition in Chile. It would imply turning 
political decisions to disarticulated parties in Santiago, while 
leaving the rest of the country potentially in military hands. At 
the same time the military have shown (on comparative terms, of 
course!) a more open attitude towards unions than towards the Marxist 
parties and the party system generally. Bustos believes in an accom-
modation with the unions on the part of the military, if unions are 
strong enough to confront them. Rojas believes that unions could 
actually play a role within the democratic tendencies which will 
eventually emerge there, precisely because of the military's greater 
willingness to relate with unions rather than with political parties.63 
What becomes apparent is that on this crucial matter, unions have not 
sufficiently thought 'with their own heads' about the solution to a 
subject of such great importance. The only concrete alternative pro-
position is that put forward by Blest, which calls for a union-based 
Congress. It is propositions like this (which would include 95% of 
the employed population, if the self-employed are considered) that 
democratic sections of the military would probably look into, because 
it would put them into direct contact and relations across the country, 
with an 'alive' social force, and secure a more stable and less 
insecure democratic transition process for this military section. 
However, the point of the matter is that the contradictions 
that General Pinochet's rule gives rise to within the military 
do not seem sufficient to produce any significant political change. 
It is only to the extent that a challenge develops from within the 
civil society, which makes the rule of the military increasingly 
more difficult and the country 'ungovernable' for them, that any 
kind of relations and influence of the unions over the military 
can start developing. But in order that unions may play a part 
in this process, their organisational and ideological development 
ought to be significantly furthered. Perhaps in this respect, 
for example, the word 'Command1, which has military connotations, 
should be abandoned by the united Council at this early stage 
(following the example of the Valparaiso workers with their 
regional body, which they preferred to call 'Movement', and were able 
to set up , after the Concepcion Command was banned upon the 
announcement of its formation)• 
C. Unions and the Church 
1. The new Church Relations with the Unions. 
The radicalisation of many active and leading Catholics; 
the failure of the Frei administration, which the Catholic 
Church had so fully supported; their 'democratic' experience with 
the Allende Government; the continuous loss of spiritual support 
among the Catholic Chilean masses throughout the Allende and the 
final years of the Frei administrations; and the conflicting 
experience with the present regime since the very s t a r t ; all 
have had an impact on the Church response to the unions. Moreover, 
the rising movement of peasants and slum dwellers which was the 
sector of the people's movement where the Church has been most in-
volved during the past 15 years, and the fact that the political 
hegemony within that movement was on the part of the unions, 
further conditioned the Church's response to the unions. One 
cannot find diffuse and undetermined statements regarding the 
unions any more from the most progressive and leading sectors 
of the Church in Chile. Cardinal Silva made this clear when 
declaring 
Workers organisations and their own associations 
- the only means workers have to make themselves 
heard - must be trusted. Their proposals must be 
stimulated, the eventual criticisms must be 
received with an open mind, their right to 
disagree must be respected theoretically and 
practically, and their patriotism taken as sincere 
as well as their will to accept sacrifices, once 
they have been heard. 
The people's search for Church backing of their economic and 
political problems as well as the religious uprising that 
followed since the coup has had a significant effect upon the 
Church. As a consequence, in their relation with the union 
movement, they have stood for: a united union movement; a secure 
influence among the workers at large; a non-violent transition 
to democracy- in particular the unions1 methods of response to 
Government policies and against party political control and 
sectarianism; although they have openly expressed their opinion 
for a multi-party based democratic political system and a 
'nationalist' economic policy. In the words of the Chilean 
Cardinal, the social mission of the Church is to achieve 
a more humane quality of life; a more equal distri-
bution of goods and opportunities; a fraternal 
relationship; to be considered a responsible 
person and acting man in history, capable of 
freely participating in politics, unions etc., 
options and in the election of Governments; 
to participate in the production process and share 
the advances of modern science and technology and 
also have access to the Society's cultural pro-
duction and dignified recreation . 
Monsignor Alfonso Baeza, head of the Santiago Vicaria de la 
Pastoral Obrera, presented one of the documents, The Rights of 
the Workers, with the following introduction: 'We shall not discuss 
human rights from an abstract and a historical perspective, but 
rather within a specific and profound historical one: the perspec-
tive of the working class and the workers' movement. To undertake 
issues in such a way is our very mission in the Vicaria de la 
Pastoral Obrera. After the May Day repressions in 1979 he 
denounced together with the Bishops of Santiago what had happened 
and stated: 'But these death signs go hand in hand with signs of 
life and hope. There has been an enormous solidarity with those 
jailed and their families. The unity of the workers and their 
leaders has strengthened. Many have realised more clearly the 
just cause behind workers' aspirations and the meaning of an 
institutionalised injustice'. 8 
Since the Labour Plan was announced, the Bishops have 
directed pastoral letters,to the peasants and to the workers' 
organisations, which are strongly critical of the Plan. They call 
upon the workers to defend their organisation and to struggle 
and promise to continue supporting them. Even though the Vicaria 
de la Solidaridad, which worked in the slums, has been sharply 
reduced after the September 1980 plebiscite5the Vicaria de la 
Pastoral Obrera has actually increased its activities. 
2. The Attitudes of the Unions. 
The response of the union leaders to the Church has been a 
positive one including the fear and respect of those who have been 
supporting the Government. Their best relations are with the CNS 
and they have supported them in every respect since the very 
beginning. At first some of the CNS leadership was particularly 
worried about their relations with the Church - especially those 
sectors which had never related with it - afraid of the movement 
losing its 'class independence'. That is the reason why autonomous 
May Day meetings have always been held, although increasingly 
workers and leaders have been attending public Mass at the 
Cathedral at noon or in the afternoon on that day. The attitude 
changed as the more suspicious leaders realised that the priests 
have nothing special hiding 'under the robe' for them to fear, 
as the rural workers' unions already knew. In fact their asso-
ciation has been mutually beneficial. For the unions, an immense 
support and a channel to gain a wider societal consensus for their 
policies; for the Church,a wide forum to influence by becoming 
'the voice of those without a voice', as the Cardinal has often 
put it. The relationship seems to be a longstanding one and with 
mutual effects. The Church has not only linked with the people 
through the campaign for the disappeared prisoners, for the return 
of the exiled and for popular dining-rooms in the slums, but with 
organised labour; for the unions, a strong humanistic-progressive 
influence that will surely have an important ideological impact 
on them. 
Perhaps the influence of the Church during these years of 
repression in Chile has been more important for the unions' drive 
for reorganisation than the role played by political parties 
generally. The Church is now playing a crucial role in the unions' 
effort to build up regional union councils. But most important of 
all, the alliance with the Church is already beginning to open up 
union relations with broad middle sectors of society and a 
general social legitimacy of great importance for their democratic 
struggle. 
D. Unions' International Relations. 
Chilean unions enjoy a vast international appeal, because 
of their radicals-democratic tradition and the wide forum gained 
by the Frei, Alienee and present administrations (although for 
very different reasons). 
Under the political conditions created by the Junta, 
including the unions' weakened relationships with political par «-
ties and the unions' lack of access to the State (Government, and 
Parliament), international unions have become a most important 
support for union struggles in Chile. This support is expressed 
in the following way: 1) The international isolation of the Junta's 
regime due to the pressure of country unions on their governments 
and parties, and by the condemnation of the regime by international 
unions at international forums, in particular the ILO annual 
Conference. This in turn has implied that within Chile a wider 
political space has opened for the struggle of the unions. 2) The 
financial assistance for party and union activities in the country. 
3) The political support for specific union activities, in par-
ticular on May Day, when unions have counted on the valuable 
participation in Chile of union leaders from different countries. 
It has both increased union mobilisation in Chile and decreased 
the intensity and extension of the repression. 
However, three main and interacting problems have derived 
from the Chilean unions' increased international relations and 
dependence on foreign assistance: 1) Problems which have arisen 
from political party activities within the unions. 2) Those 
which have been created by the influence of international unions 
themselves. 3) And those which develop from the unions1 own 
problems within Chile. 
In general terms, international unions tend to reproduce 
in their activities in Chile the divisions which exist at the 
international level. However, such activities turn actually 
into divisions within the Chilean unions to the extent that the 
behaviour of Chilean parties and unions sets an objective basis 
for such activities to find fertile ground in which to develop. 
1. The Problems Originated by the Parties 
The weakening of party relations with the unions and the 
banning of the CUT that followed the coup increased the dispersion 
of the union leadership, particularly among CD, RP and SP union 
leaders. This was an objective basis for international unions 
to act upon. In fact a union meeting held in Lima in 1977 under 
an ICFTU branch (official or unofficial) sponsorship with union 
representatives from those three political orientations, discussed 
the setting up of a different internal/external channelling of 
funds mechanism to the existing CUT External Committee (E.C.). 
If successful, it would have implied a wider split inside and 
outside Chile to the one existing at that moment based primarily 
on the Group of Ten and its links with ORIT and the AFL-CIO. At 
the same time, the split that occurred within the SP in 1979 
increased once again that possibility. One SP faction (Altamirano) 
which was not recognised at an equal level to the other faction in 
CUT E.C., started direct links with ICFTU; ICFTU withdrew its 
assistance to the CP union representation and only invited SP, 
RP and CD union officials to its Congress held in Madrid. Would 
all this have happened without the SP split having taken place 
and, most important, without the kind of handling of the problem 
which both factions and other parties undertook? I doubt it. 
There are three main conditions leading to party-based 
divisionist tendencies within the unions: a) C.P. 'hegemony'; 
b) the SP, RP and CD political and/or organic dispersion we have 
analysed above; and c) the lack of consensus within the CD leader-
ship for the union unity principle. 
However, the 1977 Lima meeting and the AFL-CIO leadership 
call in 1978 for an anti-communist union alliance between UNTRACH 
and the Group of Ten in 1978, resulted in the construction of the 
unified Command in 1979 and in CUT E.C. being asked to represent 
such command before the ILO annual meeting in 1980. This implies 
that Chilean unions gained wide (the widest possible) relations 
with international unions and at the same time regained or main-
tained their historic unity inside and outside Chile. But the 
stability of such a unity was weak. In April 1981, the Group of 
Ten has been finally organised as a separate Confederation. The 
basic union factors accounting i'or the pro-unity tendencies are: 
a) the geographical (the long5 narrow, flat aspect of the 
country, the good communication facilities and dispersion of 
natural resources) and cultural characteristics (homogeneity) of 
the country and its workers which demand the centralisation of 
political activities such as those developed by the unions; 
b) the 'memories1 of the negative experiences associated 
with union dispersion; c) the general flexibility that the 
experienced Chilean political parties show in the inter-party 
political bargaining process within the union movement, given the 
wider consensus among the political forces for unity and the fear 
of being called upon as divisionists; d) the fact that the 
strongest political forces within the unions, and the most widely 
recognised union leaders are precisely those who take the most 
consistent pro-unity stand. 
2. The Reproduction within Chile of International Unions' 
Divisions. 
Within Chile, the Group of Ten has relations primarily 
with the AFL-CIO; FUT with CLAT, the Latin American Christian 
Unions. CEPCH and UNTRACH have no formal international links 
and CNS with the ICFTU and all other international union bodies 
including the regional Latin American ICFTU affiliate with ORIT but 
not with its AFL-CIO affiliate. This picture contrasts sharply 
with the previous relative isolation from the international union 
forum of the Chilean unions, except for the regional and inter-
national branches of Marxist unions. There are two basic problems 
which international unions have not yet overcome in their 
relations with Chile. First, the lack of understanding on the 
part of Marxist unions that Chilean unions are not and will not 
be in the future (if they insist on remaining united) a 'classist' 
union movement in the sense that their orientations will be 
according to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Secondly, the resistance 
on the part of the other international union bodies to accepting a 
united union movement in Chile with broad but uncommitted links 
with international unions. The fruitful international experience 
during the most significant part of the Chilean union history has 
helped in starting to overcome such problems. 
3. Unions' Own Limitations Regarding the Unity Problems. 
The experience of organising competing union bodies in Chile 
after the coup and the development of international links on ideo-
logical grounds, particularly FUT and the Group of Ten, indicated 
the limitations of such an approach and the need for a united 
union front to stand up to the rule of the Junta. In the case of 
CNS, it indicated a different but similar problem. The fact that 
their unions receive the ICFTU funds via CUT E.C. (i.e. party 
mechanisms) has prevented them in the past from actually admini-
stering such resources which were actually being used, at least 
during the first years after the coup, for party organising 
purposes. This was particularly the case with the CD more pro-
gressive union sectors which were all within CNS. Since then, 
such a pattern has tended to change after wide union criticisms 
of the parties. But still, in both experiences, the outcome has 
been a strong reinforcement of ideological and party influences 
within the Chilean unions, which has limited their own and more 
autonomous political development and unity. 
Chilean unions were achieving once again their historic 
unity while widening their international links and support, which 
was becoming a most important factor in the material support and 
legitimacy for their struggle in the country. However, such new 
international relations did not fully mature, a basic objective 
for unions if they are to count on such a relationship to further 
their struggle within Chile. Ultimately, it will depend on 
unions' unity drives and interests being able to impose themselves 
on international and,especially, on Chilean party political 
competition. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The restructuring of Chilean society by an authoritarian 
military regime affected the social basis of the workers in 
every strata, and in the country at large (including their capa-
city to reproduce their labour force), and their organisations. 
The policies of the Junta, hegemonised by the Military and native 
and foreign financial capital, tends to limit the union struggle 
to the plant level and inhibit their political expression at the 
national level. 
Union resistance, their reorganisation into council-type 
unions, in every corner of society, the assistance of the working 
class parties, their traditions of independence from the State and 
Employers and of struggle, the assistance of the Catholic Church, 
international union organisations and of progressive members of 
liberal professions,have secured their slow but real and consist-
ent reorganisation and opened the path for an alliance with the 
middle sectors of the petty bourgeoisie. 
Presently, unions are undergoing a double struggle, for 
survival on organisational terras at different levels and in order 
to further their economic demands, increased structuring of their 
organisations according to present legislation and economic sub-
sistence; but at the same time they are searching for a new social 
project, indicating the extent to which they constitute a key 
social organisation in the development of the country's future. 
Unions have even advanced to a greater extent than the 
working class parties some of the elements of a new social project. 
In fact the parties have had important limitations for their de-
velopment. Their role vis-a-vis the unions was clear up to 1973, 
when they played a key role of class representation within the 
State and up to 1976, they have helped the unions in their drive 
to reorganise themselves. But after that., they have tried a 
policy of control more than assisting them in their concrete 
problems and struggles> by means of their external financial 
assistance to the unions. This has at the same time limited the 
process of union unity. Such a party role is increasingly less 
accepted by the unions especially within their social basis. 
On the other hand, the pressures from the grass roots which 
have strongly emerged after the publication of the Labour Plan 
has forced unions to become increasingly a mass political 
leadership at the same time that their relationship with political 
parties becomes more difficult; in fact political parties are 
less exposed to such pressures and are thus less confronted 
with the need to renew their policies and style of doing politics 
according to the new conditions of present day Chile. But if both 
organisations can overcome present obstacles, they will no doubt 
be able to play a key role in the development of the country's 
future. 
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